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ABSTRACT 
The Ladle and the Knife: Power Projection and Force Deployment under Reagan 
by Mathew D. Kawecki 
 
 This thesis examines the nature and impact of the Reagan administration’s self-described 
projection of “peace through strength.” It argues that Reagan’s defense spending surge, “Star 
Wars” (SDI) missile shield policy, and 1983 invasion of Grenada gave the president confidence 
and political cover that allowed him to withdraw U.S. Marines from Beirut in early 1984. 
Analysts and commentators focus on his muscular power projection like defense spending, SDI, 
and the invasion of Grenada, but in practice Reagan exercised a high level of restraint in troop 
deployment. These projections of power and the avoidance of protracted war in Lebanon gave 
Reagan further confidence and cover to pursue arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, 
against the protestations of anti-Soviet hardliners.  
Although Reagan supporters have credited the administration with either frightening or 
bankrupting the Soviets into disarmament, these policies—particularly his military restraint in 
Lebanon—did more to bring Reagan himself to the negotiation table. These power projection 
measures contributed to a “peace through strength” narrative embraced by much of Reagan’s 
domestic audience, allowing him to fend off accusations of Munich-style appeasement. While 
the defense spending surge helped give Reagan the confidence to ink an arms control agreement, 
the buildup created nonlinear consequences that will outlive arms control treaties.  
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Introduction: The Impossible Presidency 
– October 21–23, 1983 
 
 
Upon Ronald Reagan’s 1980 election to the U.S. presidency, former president Richard 
M. Nixon wrote a letter recommending that Reagan focus his personal attention on domestic 
policy during the beginning of his first term, not travel abroad “for at least six months,” and 
“have experienced people in State and Defense…carry out your policies until you can devote 
more of your personal time to foreign policy matters.”1 Reagan delegated his foreign policy 
accordingly. In their respective memoirs, Reagan’s National Security Advisor (NSA) Robert 
“Bud” McFarlane and his Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, frequently at odds with each 
other over foreign policy and matters of historical record, similarly described Reagan as notably 
disengaged from international events during his first year as president.2 This, however, changed 
by the weekend of  October 21–23, 1983, when world events dramatically demanded from 
President Reagan successive decisions on the use of military force. 
McFarlane, who had just been appointed Reagan’s NSA on October 17th, wrote in his 
memoir that Secretary of State George Schultz, Secretary of Treasury Don Regan, and a former 
Republican senator joined the president and Nancy Reagan for a “quiet weekend” of golfing in 
Augusta, Georgia.3 McFarlane accompanied the golfing party as White House support staff.4 
After a “pleasant dinner at the clubhouse” Friday, October 21st, the First Family retired to the 
 
1 Richard M. Nixon, “Memo to: President-elect Ronald Reagan,” Sept. 1980–Dec. 1981, 17 November 1980, Box 1, 
Post-presidential Correspondence with Ronald W. Reagan (1974–1993). Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace 
Foundation, Yorba Linda, California, 1–2.  
2 Caspar Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner Books, Inc., 
1991), 23–38. Robert C. McFarlane and Zofia Smardz, Special Trust (New York: Cadell & Davies, 1994), 171–202.  
3 Ibid., 257, 260. 
4 Ronald W. Reagan, Ronald Reagan: An American Life (New York: Pocket Books, 1990), 449. 
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Eisenhower cottage and turned in for the evening. Vice President George H.W. Bush called 
McFarlane after 3 a.m. to report that the Prime Minister of Domenica, on behalf of six other 
Caribbean countries, requested U.S. intervention in Grenada in response to a Marxist military 
coup on the island. McFarlane recounted how he recommended that the president authorize 
military action to avoid damaging “the credibility of the United States and your own 
commitment to the defense of freedom and democracy,” and that “the President never hesitated” 
to authorize Bush to begin “contingent military planning for a landing.”5 
The next afternoon, when the presidential party was on the sixteenth hole, a gunman 
broke through golf course security, took five hostages in the pro shop, and asked to speak with 
Reagan. Both McFarlane and Reagan recalled how the president attempted to talk with the man, 
but the man refused to speak. Eventually, the gunman surrendered peacefully. As if that was not 
enough pressure for a single 24-hour period, McFarlane awoke the president early that morning 
at 2 a.m. with news from the Situation Room that a suicide bomber drove an explosive-laden 
truck into the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, killing a minimum of one hundred Marines. 
Reagan and his advisors rushed onto Air Force One at 7:30 a.m. on October 23rd for a Sunday 
full of meetings on the dual foreign policy crises in Grenada and Beirut.6 
 Reagan’s October 1983 weekend is a striking example of how quickly world events can 
engulf even a president who has deliberately delegated foreign policy far away from his or her 
desk. It supports Jeremi Suri’s chronicles of how the practical constitutional powers of the 
executive branch have greatly expanded since World War II and leaves us with important 
 
5 Reagan, An American Life, 449. McFarlane and Smardz, Special Trust, 261–262. Ronald W. Reagan, The Reagan 
Diaries (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 189. 
6 McFarlane and Smardz, Special Trust, 262–267. Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, 189–190. 
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questions.7 How does a president prioritize responses to crises when simultaneous conflicts may 
require use of military force? How does a president prepare for a confluence of events like this, 
to make life-or-death decisions related to conflicts on different sides of the world on a single 
Sunday full of meetings, all the while recovering from sleep deprivation and a personally 
stressful hostage situation? 
These are not simple questions to answer. In 2019, Bud McFarlane recounted how 
Reagan authorized force on that Sunday to invade Grenada to overturn the coup, and also 
decided on a retaliatory strike on whatever militants were found to be responsible for the Beirut 
Marine Barracks bombing.8 McFarlane’s 1994 memoir notes how Reagan gave approval 
November 14 for a strike against a group of Shia militants that the CIA had linked to the 
bombing and to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Instead of following through, Secretary 
Weinberger “directly violated” the president’s order and denied authorization for the strike.9 
McFarlane believed this denial by Weinberger tipped the administration’s policy direction in 
favor of eventual withdrawal from Lebanon in February 1984. For McFarlane, this withdrawal 
was “one of the worst defeats of the Reagan administration.” Twenty-five years later, McFarlane 
passionately demonstrated his commitment to this opinion when interviewed on the subject.10 
While Reagan’s advisors remain divided on withdrawal of the Marines from Beirut to this day, 
members of his administration and his party almost unanimously believed that U.S. military 
action in Grenada supported national interests and values right in the United States’ backyard. 
Weinberger, McFarlane, and Schultz were united in their beliefs that the Grenada invasion 
 
7 Jeremi Suri, The Impossible Presidency: The Rise and Fall of America’s Highest Office (New York: Basic Books, 
2017), ix–xxiii, 174–260. 
8 Robert “Bud” McFarlane, interview by the author, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Birthplace Foundation, 
Yorba Linda, California, March 25, 2019. 
9 McFarlane and Smardz, Special Trust, 270–271. 
10 Ibid., 270–273. McFarlane, interview by the author, March 25, 2019. 
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projected a resolve to contain perceived Soviet and Cuban intervention outside of either state’s 
borders and represented a major public opinion victory on the domestic front.11   
 This thesis investigates the deliberations and outright machinations that yielded Reagan’s 
projection of military force in Grenada and restraint in and retreat from Beirut. A synthesis of 
declassified documents, memoirs, historical studies, and an oral history related to these events 
show that military victory in Grenada and quiet exit from Beirut were by no means foregone 
conclusions. If events had unfolded in a different manner or if Reagan had different advisors—a 
different Secretary of Defense, in particular—the president may have found himself entangled in 
an intractable war in Lebanon well past February 1984. Instead, Reagan withdrew the Marines 
from Lebanon without being saddled with the stigma of weakness and foreign policy failure that 
cursed Jimmy Carter throughout the Iran hostage crisis. 
 How did Reagan come out of the twin crises of Grenada and Beirut still projecting, in the 
eyes of a majority of American voters, the “peace through strength” he promised during the 1980 
presidential campaign?12 Hal Brands argued in What Good is Grand Strategy? that Reagan 
believed since the 1970s that the Soviet Union was militarily strong and possessed strategic 
superiority over the United States, but that the Soviet economy would ultimately fail if the 
United States did not succumb to Soviet power. Brands broke down Reagan’s grand strategy into 
four main components: a major military buildup to strengthen the United States’ negotiation 
position and to weaken the Soviet economy; “intensified competition” with the Soviets in the 
“Third World”; erosion of Moscow’s authority in the USSR and Eastern Europe; and leverage of 
 
11 George Schultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1993), 323–345.  McFarlane and Smardz, Special Trust, 263–273. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, 101–174. 
12 Elizabeth Edwards Spalding, “The Origin and Meaning of Reagan’s Cold War,” in The Reagan Presidency: 
Assessing the Man and His Legacy, ed. Paul Kengor and Peter Schweizer (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 
58. 
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the former three components to negotiate a better relationship between the two superpowers.13 
This is not an inaccurate description of how Reagan’s grand strategy played out, but such a 
narrative overlooks a constant central theme in Reagan’s foreign policy: his administration 
exercised considerable restraint in deploying U.S. troops overseas. 
 Brands acknowledged that “Reagan shied away from U.S. troops” and that he “knew that 
costly military misadventures could easily rupture” the “Cold War consensus” among the 
American public that emerged during years of perceived Soviet advances.14 Yet, Brands did not 
frame this restraint as a central tenet of Reagan’s grand strategy, and neither do most other 
scholars, former administration officials, or Reagan supporters. Cheerleaders and critics alike 
instead emphasize the more aggressive aspects of Reagan’s foreign policy, the defense budget 
surge, his “Star Wars” Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and covert action in the “Third World” 
and Eastern Europe, as setting the table for arms control negotiations later in his presidency. This 
emphasis is understandable, as the Reagan administration spoke much more about “peace 
through strength,” rather than about the strength it gained from restraint and avoidance of 
unwieldy, costly military engagements like the Vietnam War. Commentators may also overlook 
the role of Reagan’s restraint in deploying troops in his eventual arms control negotiation success 
because no single member of the administration espoused this long-term strategy. Reagan’s 
advisors lobbied and schemed to convince the president to adopt their policy prescriptions, and 
different officials and institutions succeeded at different times.  
This thesis demonstrates how Reagan’s defense budget surge, “Star Wars” program, and 
military action in Grenada gave Reagan the personal confidence and political cover to withdraw 
 
13 Hal Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to 
George W. Bush (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014), 107–117. 
14 Ibid., 113. 
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U.S. Marines from Beirut rather than escalating U.S. military involvement. Although the national 
security value of Reagan’s retreat from Beirut and reluctance to deploy troops in other potential 
conflicts is hotly disputed between many of Reagan’s senior advisors in their memoirs, careful 
study of these memoirs, official documents, and Reagan’s own writings reveal that restraint 
became a key component of Reagan’s grand strategy. This frequently overlooked restraint spared 
Reagan the quagmires that plagued several past—and future—administrations and gave him 
room to move forward with his historic negotiations that marked the beginning of the end of the 
Cold War. 
 
Reagan on Defense: From “Evil Empire” to “Ivan and Anya” 
  Why did Reagan respond with restraint to the October 1983 Beirut Marine barracks 
bombing? It is perhaps most fruitful to examine this question in the greater context of Reagan’s 
first term. Reagan and Weinberger spent the first two years pumping up the defense budget as 
promised in the 1980 presidential campaign, and on March 8, 1983 Reagan delivered a speech at 
the annual meeting of the National Association of Evangelicals where he called the Soviet Union 
an “evil empire” and the arms race a “struggle between right and wrong and good and evil.”15 
Reagan appeared poised before his base to meet any Soviet challenge with great force, even U.S. 
troops.  
 The Reagan administration and many of its loyal supporters claim that his defense 
spending surge won the Cold War by pressuring Soviet economic and political structures to 
collapse. In short, they argue that Reagan executed the coherent grand strategy Brands described, 
 
15 James Graham Wilson, The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev’s Adaptability, Reagan’s Engagement, and the 
End of the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014), 70–71. 
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and that it was thoroughly effective. While it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of Reagan’s 
defense spending surge and SDI in weakening the Soviet Union, these policy initiatives crafted a 
compelling narrative to the American public—and to Reagan himself—of “peace through 
strength.” Against this background of power projection and with a resounding military success in 
Grenada, Weinberger’s consistent resistance against utilizing American troops kept Reagan out 
of Vietnam-like entanglements in Beirut and elsewhere during a period of Soviet decline, 
creating space for Reagan to negotiate an arms control agreement from a position of self-
perceived strength and in a manner he felt satisfied domestic constituencies. 
 Academics and political operatives, no matter what their view of Reagan’s presidential 
performance, almost unanimously hold up Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s arms control negotiations that yielded a succession of agreements as a triumph of 
global statecraft. Scores of books have been written on this subject, bearing a wide range of 
interpretations of what led to the agreements and, thus, to the end of the Cold War. Many 
historians center on Reagan’s pivot in his rhetorical and policy approaches toward the Soviet 
Union around halfway through his presidency.16 On January 16, 1984, only ten months after his 
“evil empire” speech, Reagan asked America to “suppose… for a moment that an Ivan and an 
Anya could find themselves… with a Jim and Sally, and there was no language barrier to keep 
them from getting acquainted.”17 On November 17, 1985, Reagan met with Gorbachev for a 
summit in Geneva, the first tangible step in warming relations between the two countries.18  
 
16 Beth A. Fischer, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War (Columbia: University of 
Missouri Press, 1997), 102–156. Wilson, The Triumph of Improvisation, 70–71. Gail E.S. Yoshitani, Reagan on 
War: A Reappraisal of the Weinberger Doctrine, 1980–1984 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2012), 
58–142. 
17 Ibid., 81. 
18 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended (New York: Random House, 2004), 159–
173. 
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Scholars and political writers have put forward a wide range of hypotheses about why 
Reagan pivoted to this diplomatic path during this period. Suri and Brands took Reagan’s grand 
strategy at face value, crediting his arms control overtures with ushering in the end of the Cold 
War, differing in their assessments of Reagan’s long-term consistency. Suri dismissed Reagan’s 
“earlier anti-communist belligerence” as at odds with his later arms control initiatives, whereas 
Brands gives credence to administration officials’ later claims that the defense budget increase 
and SDI were tactics designed to strengthen the United States’ hand in negotiations.19 Many 
conservative pundits, such as Dinesh D’Souza, have peddled a much less critical version of the 
Brands narrative, lauding Reagan’s grand strategy as premeditated genius that buoyed American 
political and economic fortunes while forcing Gorbachev to negotiate as communism collapsed 
under the weight of Soviet response to the U.S. defense buildup.20 Stephen Kotkin, in 
Armageddon Averted, represents the other end of the analytical spectrum as he contended that 
the arms agreements and the end of the Cold War resulted from Gorbachev’s rise to power on the 
Soviet side. According to Kotkin, Reagan and his team simply reacted to Soviet overtures, and 
the world is fortunate that Reagan’s initially belligerent rhetoric and actions did not forestall this 
positive outcome.21 
James Wilson, Beth Fischer, and Gail Yoshitani, in the vein of Suri, all have argued that 
Reagan indeed changed direction in his grand strategy, though each put forth different reasons 
for Reagan’s alleged transformation. Wilson, in The Triumph of Improvisation, credited George 
Schultz with eroding hardline opposition to arms control within the administration. Reagan 
 
19 Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy?, 105–119, 126–135. Suri, The Impossible Presidency, 252–253. 
20 Dinesh D’Souza, Ronald Reagan: How an Ordinary Man Became and Extraordinary Leader (New York: The 
Free Press, 1997), 129–198. 
21 Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970–2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
1–9, 58–108, 171–190. 
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ultimately came to recognize Schultz’s arms control negotiation strategy as “carrying out my 
policy.”22 Fischer, in The Reagan Reversal, rooted the president’s shift in his personal 
psychology, laying out a chronology of incidents in 1983 that she argued frightened Reagan 
away from his previous bellicose approach as he increasingly recognized nuclear annihilation as 
an existential threat.23 Yoshitani, in Reagan on War: A Reappraisal of the Weinberger Doctrine, 
chronicled a linear evolution in grand strategy from covert use of force in Latin America to failed 
direct deployment in Beirut to Weinberger’s restrained approach of force application that limited 
Reagan’s deployment of troops for the remainder of his presidency.24 Yoshitani highlighted 
Reagan and Weinberger’s restraint, an aspect of Reagan’s foreign policy overlooked by most 
scholars of the subject, but presented it as a prepackaged doctrine to which Reagan pivoted after 
running into less than ideal outcomes using other approaches. Both Reagan and Weinberger’s 
approaches to grand strategy were more complex and uneven than Yoshitani depicted.  
Lastly, Melvyn Leffler touched on the domestic political component to Reagan’s arms 
negotiations successes in For the Soul of Mankind, describing how the president did not have to 
face “partisan recriminations and conservative criticism” that dissuaded Democrats Truman, 
Kennedy, Johnson, and Carter from pursuing bold diplomatic initiatives with the Soviets.25  
Evaluating whether Reagan’s defense buildup, SDI, and military victory in Grenada 
strained the Soviet economy or frightened Gorbachev into making arms control concessions 
requires thorough treatment of official documents, correspondences, and oral histories written in 
Russian. Of the scholars and political writers described above, Kotkin makes the most substantial 
 
22 Wilson, The Triumph of Improvisation, 86. 
23 Fischer, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War, 102–156. 
24 Yoshitani, Reagan on War, 58–142. 
25 Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, The Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New York: 
Hill and Wang, A Division of Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), 463–465. 
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use of Russian language sources, which allowed him to tell the Soviet side of the story in greater 
detail.  
This thesis sets aside questions about the Soviet reaction to Reagan’s rhetoric and 
maneuvers and instead evaluates English language sources from the American side. Regardless 
of whether Reagan’s defense spending surge, SDI gambit, and Grenada invasion frightened or 
helped bankrupt the Soviet Union, these developments gave Reagan the confidence and political 
cover he needed to withdraw Marines from Lebanon, and to eventually sit down at the 
negotiation table with Gorbachev. 
  
	 11	
1   Cap the Ladle: Peace through Strength 
– 1968 to June 1982 
 
 
Ronald Reagan intoned a very different strain of national security rhetoric from his 
Republican presidential forebears Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. Though Nixon and Reagan 
were both Californians and conservative giants, they were rivals in the 1968 Republican primary 
and retained foreign policy differences years after that election. Pat Buchanan, who worked as 
chief opposition researcher for the Nixon campaign, flagged for Nixon a series of speeches and 
articles where Reagan called for U.S. escalation in Vietnam. This position was starkly opposed 
to Nixon’s own foreign policy platform.26 Buchanan wrote in the margins of one of these filed 
articles, “Echoes of Goldwater!!!”27 This was not likely a compliment to California Governor 
Reagan, given Barry Goldwater’s resounding 1964 electoral defeat, but perhaps a nudge to 
Nixon that he needed to somehow lead more hardline conservatives over to his budding détente 
approach and accepting an end to the military draft. While acknowledging the differences in 
Nixon and Reagan’s foreign policy outlooks, Buchanan highlighted key Reagan speeches for 
Nixon, encouraging him to ape aspects of Reagan’s style and content.28 Nixon wrote a note to his 
speechwriter Ray Price on one of Buchanan’s memos that though Reagan might use 
“demagoguery,” he successfully “reaches the heart,” while “we reach the head.”29 Nixon and his 
staff understood that they needed to appeal to Reagan-style conservatives even as Nixon and 
 
26 Vietnam – Reagan, Box 104, Research Files (PPS 500, 501), Campaign 1968 Collection, Richard Nixon Pre-
Presidential Materials (Laguna Niguel). Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ronald Reagan Speeches, 1968, Box 1 Ronald Reagan, PPS 501 Research Files Special Files, Campaign 1968 
Collection, Richard Nixon Pre-Presidential Materials (Laguna Niguel). Richard Nixon Presidential Library and 
Museum, Yorba Linda, California. 
29 Pat Buchanan, “Memo to RN,” Reagan Ronald Speech Files III (2 of 2), Ronald Reagan Speeches, 1968, Box 1 
Ronald Reagan, PPS 501 Research Files Special Files, Campaign 1968 Collection, Richard Nixon Pre-Presidential 
Materials (Laguna Niguel). Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California. 
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Kissinger pursued de-escalation and détente with the Soviet Union and other Communist 
countries. 
Just as Nixon understood the attraction of Reagan’s confrontational anti-Communist 
style, Reagan recognized the appeal to American voters of peace on U.S. terms. If détente 
succeeded, Reagan was ready to support a successful Republican-led outcome, albeit not under 
the label of détente. Reagan, still governor of California and an influential conservative voice, 
initially strongly opposed Nixon and Kissinger’s 1971 diplomatic talks with the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). Reagan was especially livid when the United Nations adopted an 
Albanian resolution to replace Taiwan with the PRC on the Security Council on the heels of an 
October 1971 Kissinger visit to Beijing. He called Nixon and demanded that the president 
convince Congress to cut off appropriations for the UN, and later told Kissinger that “the people 
[of America]… are really pee’d off.”30 Reagan changed his tune in February 1972 when Nixon 
returned from his historic trip to China. Kissinger related to the president that “Reagan 
congratulated you” and “said it was one of the greatest weeks of the American presidency.” 
Nixon quipped in response, “Of course Reagan can see it in terms of the political impact, the 
television impact.”31 Reagan pivoted similarly from rhetorical belligerence to brokerage of peace 
during the 1980s with the Soviet Union. 
Reagan, after completing his second and final term as California governor in 1975, wrote 
and narrated a radio program, a platform from which he resumed his long campaign for the 
presidency. He continued to criticize Nixon-Ford détente and what he viewed as 
accommodationist foreign policy that would leave the world vulnerable to Communist 
 
30 Chris Tudda, A Cold War Turning Point: Nixon and China, 1969–1972 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 2012), 104–141. 
31 Ibid., 202. 
	 13	
exploitation. He hit Nixon and Ford on the U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam and the fall of 
Saigon to North Vietnam, calling the ensuing debate over ending military aid to the South “an 
echo of the hollow tapping of Neville Chamberlain’s umbrella on the cobblestones of Munich.”32 
Shortly after announcing in November 1975 that he would oppose President Ford in the 1976 
Republican presidential primary, he categorized the Nixon-Ford foreign policy approach as weak 
and dangerous. “A decade ago we had military superiority. Today we are in danger of being 
surpassed by a nation that has never made any effort to hide its hostility to everything we stand 
for. Through détente we have sought peace with our adversaries.”33 
In the 1980 presidential election, Reagan had an even easier time drawing a distinction 
between Jimmy Carter’s perceived losses to the Soviet Union and the Islamic Republic of Iran 
and his own promises to strengthen America by beefing up the defense budget. Reagan posed an 
unapologetic alternative to Carter’s calls to make sacrifices and instill limitations to address 
economic and energy crises, launching his presidential candidacy by announcing that bold and 
strong leadership could restore the nation’s fortunes. “The crisis we face is not the result of any 
failure of the American spirit; it is the failure of our leaders to establish rational goals and give 
our people something to order their lives by.”34 At the Republican nominating convention in July 
1980, he enumerated the troubling events of the Iran hostage crisis, the discovery of a Soviet 
combat brigade in Cuba, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan before asking audiences if the 
United States was “stronger and more respected” than it was before Carter became president.35 
Reagan hit Carter hard on national security up until the eve of the election, punctuating his 
 
32 Rick Perlstein, The Invisible Bridge: The Fall of Nixon and the Rise of Reagan (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2014), 431–432. 
33 Ibid., 548. 
34 Yoshitani, Reagan on War, 4–5. 
35 Ibid., 13. 
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October 28, 1980 debate with Carter with a series of questions for the American people: “Is 
America as respected throughout the world as it was? Do you feel your security is safe, that 
we’re strong as we were four years ago?”36  
For Reagan and the Republican Party he led in 1980, the leadership of “peace through 
strength” embodied in Reagan was the antidote to Carter’s alleged “weakness” and “vacillation.” 
“Peace through strength” was not just a vague idea, however. The Republican platform for 1980 
tied this concept directly to the quantitative measure of the defense budget by promising: 
To achieve overall military and technological superiority over the Soviet Union; To 
create a strategic and civil defense which would protect the American people against 
nuclear war at least as well as the Soviet population is protected; To accept no arms 
control agreement which in any way jeopardizes the security of the United States or its 
allies, or which locks the United States into a position of military inferiority; To 
reestablish effective security and intelligence capabilities.37 
 
Contemporaneous polling data showed that a large section of the American public had 
also come to associate security and global prestige with defense spending, thus it is not 
surprising that Reagan called for more robust investment of taxpayer dollars into defense. An 
NBC poll from September 1979, prior to the global crises Reagan blamed on Carter’s leadership 
failures, reported that 38 percent of participants thought American spent too little on defense. By 
January 1980, the same polling data revealed that 69 percent of Americans now called for more 
defense spending.38 A large number of American voters believed that growing the defense 
budget would make the country safer and more widely respected, ushering Reagan into the 
White House with a mandate to spend.   
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1.1   Strength through Spending: Pumping Up the Defense Budget 
Reagan’s Cold War grand strategy did not simply break with Nixon and Ford in his 
public disparagement of their efforts to pursue détente with the Soviet Union. He also departed 
considerably from past Republicans’ fiscally conservative approach to the defense budget. Nixon 
believed that the Pentagon budget was bloated, and he explicitly recommended to Reagan that he 
appoint a Secretary of Defense who would not treat the Pentagon budget as a “sacred cow” and 
would “clean up the establishment” and “fat in the bureaucracy” at Defense. Nixon 
recommended “an across-the-board 10% cut in civilian employment” in the Department of 
Defense (DOD), and suggested one of Nixon’s former Secretaries of the Treasury, John 
Connally or George Schultz, carry out the budgetary liposuction.39 Reagan instead opted for 
Caspar Weinberger, another Nixon cabinet figure but also a former California deputy of Reagan. 
Weinberger went on to preside over increases in DOD budget authority exceeding 10 percent 
each of the first two years of Reagan’s presidency.40 
 Before helming the Pentagon upon Reagan’s 1981 inauguration, Caspar Weinberger’s 
reputation was that of a merciless budget cutter. Weinberger worked on Reagan’s 1966 campaign 
for California governor to develop, in his own words, “a plan to apply business organizational 
principles to government, and to fold the one hundred fifty or so state agencies, theoretically 
reporting to the Governor, into five groups, each under the equivalent of a corporate group vice 
president.” Weinberger worked as Reagan’s Director of Finance beginning in 1968, in which 
capacity he implemented Reagan and his preference for “austerity” in state spending and 
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produced a small surplus in Reagan’s first year that led to “one of the first tax refunds in the 
state’s history.”41 
 It is useful to reflect on Weinberger’s touting of his own budget astringency in California 
in the 1960s because it contrasts so starkly with the budget largesse he later bestowed upon the 
Pentagon in the 1980s. Weinberger had developed an even more intensely thrifty reputation as 
“Cap the Knife”—an alias he relished even late in life—while working as President Nixon’s 
Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and as Secretary of Health, Education, 
and Welfare (HEW) under both Nixon and Ford. When Reagan rejected Nixon’s advice to 
appoint Schultz or Connolly to streamline the Pentagon’s budget, Nixon may still have expected 
his former budget trimmer to slice the defense budget. Weinberger, however, viewed defense 
needs very differently from how he regarded the federal government’s role in health, education, 
and welfare spending. According to Weinberger, Nixon appointed him as Secretary of HEW to 
apply “fiscal and managerial discipline” to the federal government’s “highest-spending 
department.” Weinberger enacted an agenda of privatization, program reduction, and devolution 
to local government in the areas of social services under his purview. In his second memoir, he 
laid out a laudatory narrative about how he opposed the “Iron Triangle” of Congress, lobbyists, 
and department bureaucracies to “change the status quo” in HEW.42  
 In contrast, Weinberger became lobbyist-in-chief for a whole host of military 
technologies and troop enhancements while serving as Reagan’s Secretary of Defense. In the 
realm of national security budgets, “Cap the Knife” became “Cap the Ladle” to his critics, as his 
military attaché Colin Powell later recorded.43 This was not an about-face for Weinberger, who 
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consistently espoused inverse philosophies when it came to the HEW and defense budgets. In 
1972, a year before Nixon moved him from OMB to HEW, Weinberger stated his philosophy 
with abundant clarity in a U.S. News & World Report interview: 
In education, in health, in welfare, and in almost every other field, what the federal 
government doesn’t do, other levels of government or the private sector will attempt to 
do. The only unit of government that pays for defense is the federal government. What 
we don’t do in defense at the national level doesn’t get done.  
 
That same year at the American Enterprise Institute, Weinberger vented early fears about the 
defense budget. “If our defense budget is inadequate, nothing else will be of much moment, and 
we will only know when it is too late.” Weinberger took charge of the Pentagon budget eight 
years later, and in his memoir he wrote, “as I began receiving the classified data on our 
capabilities, I found it was even worse than I thought. It was truly appalling. Our nuclear 
deterrent was in serious need of modernization. Our conventional forces were underbudgeted and 
undersupplied…they were unready.”44 
Weinberger’s conclusions on military readiness were not the only interpretation of this 
classified data available to the president. Carter’s outgoing CIA director, Stanfield Turner, 
provided Reagan with a very different briefing on the U.S.-Soviet military balance on Reagan’s 
first day as president, stating “that the question was not the numbers of bombs and missiles but 
the operational capacity to use them, and that according to CIA estimates, the USSR had no 
advantage over the United States…[and] even after a Soviet first strike, the U.S. would have 
enough strategic nuclear weapons to destroy all Soviet cities with populations over 100,000.”45 
Nonetheless, Reagan and Weinberger moved forward to add $32 billion to the Carter 
administration’s 1981 and 1982 defense budget requests for Congress. Years later, Weinberger 
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described their goals as “moderniz[ing] all three legs of the strategic triad…our sea-based, air-
based, and ground-based nuclear missiles”; “rebuild[ing] our conventional strength, including 
finally deploying…the M-1 [battle tank]; “additional…equipment for the Rapid Deployment 
Force”; “enhanced electronic warfare capabilities”; and “improved intelligence capabilities.”46 
Weinberger’s assessment of U.S. strength and ability to counter the Soviet Union, unlike that of 
Turner, rested primarily on tabulation of technological capabilities, rather than on either side’s 
“operational capacity”—to use Turner’s phrase—to translate those capabilities into achieving 
actual military objectives. 
Weinberger’s 1972 rhetoric on defense spending and his recollections of Reagan and his 
defense modernization strategy are fully consistent with how Weinberger reported his activities 
to the president in his weekly reports. While Weinberger’s reports from Reagan’s second term 
are not yet available to the public, recently declassified reports from Reagan’s first term show 
that the Secretary of Defense spent a considerable amount of his time lobbying Congress and the 
public to support maximal increase of the defense budget and approval of high ticket military 
hardware.47 Although Weinberger appeared to have merged seamlessly into the “Iron Triangle” 
he combatted as Secretary of HEW, the consistency of his approach with his past rhetoric on the 
exceptional nature of defense spending point to ideological motivations for his budget advocacy, 
rather than any untoward influence of military-industrial lobbyists. In the midst of Weinberger’s 
steady lobbying of Congress to grow the defense budget, he reported to Reagan that he ended 
government reimbursement of lobbying costs to defense contractors, a practice he found to be 
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wasteful and a perverse incentive.48 Weinberger also made a point to report small cost-saving 
measures to Reagan, such as a new procurement program to save on “audiovisual products” used 
by military personnel globally and a “highest priority” effort to “reduce the volume of travel and 
its costs for DOD personnel.49 
 The majority of Weinberger’s weekly reports to Reagan lead off with progress updates on 
his efforts to lobby congresspeople to vote in favor of approving an increased annual defense 
budget or approving requests to develop, purchase, and deploy major technologies like the B-1 
bomber and land-based MX intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).50 As early as March 6, 
1981, Weinberger began submitting detailed reports about private meetings with named 
congresspeople, readouts on briefings given to congressional meetings, and projected vote tallies 
accompanied by suggestions to the president as to whom he should personally lobby to switch 
their vote.51 In his August 7, 1981 report, in the midst of the nationwide air traffic controllers 
strike, he assured the president that “DOD provided travel assistance early this week to several 
Members of Congress who faced difficulties in getting to Washington for key votes” on final 
approval of the administration’s $2.7 billion FY1981 supplemental defense authorization bill.52 
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Weinberger prioritized these congressional budget lobbying updates to such a degree that, in his 
July 9, 1982 report, he even presented the details of a “severe budget situation” and related 
legislative issues before his reportage of deployment of U.S. Marines to Lebanon.53 
 Weinberger’s laser focus on Congress as a primary target of engagement coincided with a 
year and a half period free of overt military conflict. Nixon, in his November 1980 post-election 
cabinet selection memo to Reagan, explicitly recommended that the president focus his personal 
attention on domestic policy during the beginning of his presidency, not travel abroad “for at 
least six months,” and “have experienced people in State and Defense…carry out your policies 
until you can devote more of your personal time to foreign policy matters.”54 Reagan delegated 
his foreign policy accordingly. Like Weinberger and McFarlane, Reagan’s first Secretary of 
State Alexander Haig also described Reagan as notably disengaged from international events 
during his first year as president.55 Weinberger’s reports to Reagan show that, contrary to 
Nixon’s advice, the Secretary of Defense at least as focused on the domestic policy aspects of his 
job as the president. 
 For Weinberger, the budgetary battles of Capitol Hill were the nation’s first line of 
defense. He was concerned that the United States’ industrial base was “eroding,” and he 
frequently invoked that talking point when lobbying Congress to grow the defense budget and 
when defending Reagan’s tax cuts.56 Weinberger also argued to Congress, as did Reagan, that 
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simultaneously cutting taxes and pumping government funding into the defense industry would 
generate private sector growth turning the projected $55 billion deficit for 1981 into a surplus 
beginning in 1984.57  
 In addition to touting economic revitalization benefits that Weinberger and Reagan 
divined would follow state investment in the defense industry, there is evidence the Secretary of 
Defense believed that Pentagon resources were truly insufficient to properly contain the Soviet 
threat. In Weinberger’s weekly reports to the president, he treated all Soviet military and political 
maneuvers as threats that needed to be matched with superior U.S. force capabilities.58 His 
conception of militarized containment tracked closely with the formulation Paul Nitze, Special 
Advisor to the President on Arms Control, had promoted within previous administrations 
beginning with his drafting of the U.S. government’s 1950 Basic National Security Policy, 
known as NSC-68.59  
While George Kennan, the State Department’s first Director of Policy Planning, is widely 
remembered as the father of the American Cold War strategy of containment, historian John 
Lewis Gaddis effectively argues that Kennan’s immediate successor Nitze carried the day in 
militarizing and geographically broadening Kennan’s approach. As Gaddis put it: “where 
Kennan tended to look at the Soviet threat in terms of an independently established concept of 
irreducible interests, NSC-68 derived its view of American interests primarily from its 
perception of the Soviet threat.”60 Kennan laid out a multilayered strategy of containing the 
Soviet Union through economic, political, and military initiatives, focusing efforts on key 
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strategic “strong points” like Western Europe and Japan. Nitze’s NSC-68, by contrast, primarily 
emphasized military measures, applied in the broad service of “adequate defense against air and 
surface attack on the United Kingdom and Western Europe, Alaska, the Western Pacific, Africa, 
and the Near and Middle East.”61 
Nitze distanced himself from the Vietnam failures of Presidents John F. Kennedy and 
Lyndon B. Johnson, even though declassified meeting notes show that both presidents and their 
advisors spoke the militarized containment language of Nitze’s NSC-68.62 Nitze lamented that 
Johnson and McNamara had failed to protect vital U.S. interests by letting “events… shap[e] our 
policy,” rather than shaping events through grand strategy.63 Nitze took McNamara to task in his 
memoir for what he considered a dangerous 1963 retooling of U.S. nuclear deterrence policy in 
reaction to Congressional budgetary restrictions. He equally exhibited distaste for how Johnson 
let domestic political considerations influence his Vietnam decisions, like in late 1965 when 
Johnson rejected Nitze’s proposal to reform the draft to increase troop volume because Nitze’s 
plan “still favored what [Johnson] called the ‘Eastern Establishment.’”64 He criticized Johnson 
and McNamara for lacking a strategy in Vietnam, but what he really wanted was an unrestrained 
commitment to more muscular tactics.     
In terms of the defense budget, Reagan and Weinberger strove to deliver what Nitze had 
long sought: maximum force projection capabilities without regard for congressional pushback 
or economic limitations. Reagan’s initial embrace of supply-side economics and large tax cuts 
freed him from the fiscal conservativism that restrained the defense spending of Republican 
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White House predecessors.65 Dwight Eisenhower, for example, trimmed the fiscal demands of 
Nitze’s NSC-68 strategy of symmetric opposition to every Soviet threat by pivoting to greater 
reliance on allies and nuclear deterrence.66 Weinberger did more than just give the Pentagon the 
hardware and personnel it wanted. As his military attaché Colin Powell later described, he 
continually asked for larger budgets from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who “went from their wish 
lists to their dream lists.”67 
 Weinberger anchored his defense buildup argument on symmetric containment of the 
Soviet Union. In 1981 he asked the Pentagon to publish a glossy booklet entitled Soviet Military 
Power utilizing declassified intelligence to convince readers that Soviet force capabilities far 
outstripped pre-Reagan military might. Weinberger boasted to Reagan in a weekly report that the 
document would become a “bestseller,” and “may even turn a profit for the government.” In the 
same report, he vowed that the document’s purpose was “to inform free people of the free 
nations of the real challenge they face.”68 The administration distributed the booklet to Congress, 
opinion leaders, and even Nixon held in his personal files a copy that Reagan had sent him.69  
It is difficult to assess whether this booklet influenced its readers in any way, though 
Weinberger himself admitted to Reagan that “the Soviets have not attempted…to refute any of 
the facts or figures we presented in our book Soviet Military Power in the USSR’s own 
propaganda pamphlet, Europe in Danger, decrying U.S. nuclear missile escalation.70 What is 
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more clear from his reports to the president is that Weinberger viewed this presentation of the 
Soviet military threat as essential to his lobbying efforts in the White House and on Capitol 
Hill.71 Convincing Americans that they were under threat and needed to purchase protection was 
the central pillar of Weinberger’s national security strategy during the first two years of Reagan’s 
presidency. 
 
1.2   Strength through Arming Allies: The Falklands War – 1982 
The United States’ role in the 1982 war between Argentina and Great Britain over the 
Falkland Islands is a clear illustration of how Weinberger directly correlated power projection 
with spending on defense hardware. On the night of April 1–2, the Argentinian navy invaded the 
Falklands, a British dependent territory over which Argentina also claimed sovereignty.72 
Margaret Thatcher’s government immediately called on the United States to intervene on its 
behalf, and Reagan’s advisors were divided over how to respond.73 Comparing Weinberger and 
then-Secretary of State Haig’s interpretations of the U.S. role in the Falklands War is instructive. 
Haig believed it necessary for the United States to mediate negotiations as a neutral party if it 
were to maintain its stature as leader of the free world.74 Weinberger, on the other hand, 
maintained throughout the crisis that the United States should openly support Britain with arms 
and intelligence to show the world that America resolutely supported its allies in all 
circumstances.75  
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The two advisors’ narratives accord in how they describe each other’s opposing 
Falklands strategy, but disagree as to whether or not the United States provided Britain with 
extraordinary military support during the first month of the war. After Haig’s negotiations broke 
down, Reagan announced his formal decision on April 30 to sanction Argentina and route 
“material support” to Britain.76 Haig’s account of the diplomatic breakdown is detailed, tracing 
the complex nuances of Argentinian and British history and politics that contributed to the 
collapse of peace talks in bloody military conflict that left nearly one thousand dead. He faults 
leaks “from the White House and elsewhere” about secret negotiation details and “extraordinary 
intelligence support to Britain” with seriously undermining the talks.77 Haig stated that these 
claims were patently false and gave Argentina “firm assurances” that “since the outset of the 
crisis, the United States had not granted British requests that would go beyond the scope of our 
customary patterns of cooperation.”78  
Weinberger, writing five years after Haig published his memoir, contradicts this version 
of events. He recounts how shortly after the start of the war he “passed word to the Department 
that all existing requests from the United Kingdom for military equipment were to be honored at 
once; and that if the British made any new requests for any other equipment or other types of 
support, short of our actual participation in their military action, those requests should also be 
granted.”79 He addresses Haig’s claim directly as well. “Former Secretary Haig said he spent 
some time at his negotiating sessions with the Argentines in telling them we had refused to fulfill 
British requests for arms. If he did tell them that, he was simply wrong.”80 
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Recently declassified Pentagon documents show that Weinberger was telling the truth, 
and that “other types of support” certainly included military intelligence and satellite data.81 
These DOD communications would have been accessible to Haig’s staff if Haig had wished to 
become fully cognizant of what support the Pentagon provided Britain in the midst of Haig’s 
shuttle diplomacy. Under a broad definition, the intelligence and logistics assistance Weinberger 
authorized all fell under the umbrella of “routine” support.82 Thus Haig may have simply chosen 
his words very carefully when he said the leaks about “extraordinary” support were false in order 
to malign the leakers in favor of his legacy.83 Or Haig chose to willfully ignore any Pentagon 
support of Britain to maintain plausible deniability as a neutral peace-broker through the course 
of his April 1982 bid to become a heroic statesman in the vein of his mentor Henry Kissinger. 
Either way, in light of the newly released Pentagon documents, the Argentines had a right to be 
suspicious, and Haig’s negotiation efforts proceeded with the serious handicap of either his lack 
of access to information or his own prevarication as a mediator. 
Haig wrote that his Falklands efforts “ultimately cost [him his] job as Secretary of State.” 
Haig’s forced resignation on June 25th, which occurred fewer than two weeks after the Falklands 
War conclusion, also happened within three weeks of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and was 
more complicated than Haig makes it sound. 84  However, the lack of coordination and outright 
competition between cabinet members exhibited during the Falklands War would become a 
recurring theme throughout the course of Reagan’s presidency. As will be seen, at key moments, 
Reagan empowered a branch of his national security apparatus to move forward with a major 
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initiative without the support—and sometimes the knowledge—of other departments and 
agencies.85  
 When Weinberger “passed word to the Department” during Haig’s negotiations to arm 
the British for confrontation with Argentina, was that a unilateral decision or on the president’s 
orders?86 Weinberger’s vague choice of words was almost certainly deliberate, whether he acted 
on his own or on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief. Unfortunately, the answer is not yet found 
in documents available to the public. Later events surrounding the decision to not retaliate 
against the perpetrators of the Beirut Marine barracks bombing point to private communications 
between Weinberger and the president that the two kept secret from other members of the 
cabinet. 
Regardless of whether Weinberger bestowed intelligence and logistical support upon 
Britain before April 30th under specific orders or with general autonomy of decision granted by 
Reagan, he directly linked his Falklands role as “assistant supply sergeant” to the British Navy 
with projection of America’s global strength and indispensability to its allies. In his memoir, 
Weinberger lauded the British for their “resolve and military skill,” but emphasized their reliance 
on U.S. Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, aircraft fuel, and encrypted radio receivers in winning a 
naval battle on the American side of the Atlantic.87 During the Falklands War, Cap’s 
procurement ladle extended to a key American ally, whom he supported without hesitation from 
the moment hostilities erupted. Whether or not he was behind the leaks that dogged Haig’s 
negotiation efforts, he made no secret of his glee in confirming on April 30th that “the president’s 
heart was with Britain.” Weinberger characterized the British victory over Argentina as a 
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“successful American action” that demonstrated “evidence of our new capabilities and resolve” 
in the service of telling “the world that aggression would not be allowed to succeed” and “that 
freedom and the rule of law had strong and effective defenders.”88 
Though Weinberger gushed about American and British success in the Falklands War 
eight years after its completion, in the immediate aftermath he leveraged the war as an example 
of how America was still woefully unprepared for armed conflict. In a June 4, 1982 report to the 
president, Weinberger proposed generating a formal study of the impact of American armament 
on British success in the Falklands, claiming that “preliminary assessments would indicate strong 
justification for the present direction of our defense program,” particularly in the realm of 
bolstering air superiority.89 The political utility of this analysis was not lost on the president, and 
his National Security Advisor (NSA) William Clark tasked Weinberger on June 29th with 
conducting “an in-depth analysis of the military lessons to be learned” from the Falklands War 
and emerging Lebanon crisis. Clark gave Weinberger a deadline of September 15 for this 
analysis and asked for “suggested interim public affairs guidance by July 7,” as the “military 
lessons of those conflicts could become topics of discussion during Congressional consideration 
of the Administration’s defense request and ultimately influence public attitudes towards U.S. 
defense policy.”90 
The wording of Clark’s memo appeared to nudge analysis in a particular direction, and 
Weinberger landed on conclusions that bolstered the case for more defense spending. In a July 
19 memo to the president sharing “early observations” from a study ultimately concluded mid-
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October, Weinberger enumerated specific British technological vulnerabilities that made the 
Falklands War “a closer call than many would believe” and a conflict in which “luck also played 
a significant role.” He highlighted “the difficulty of Britain—and possibly other allies—to 
support over time non-NATO military actions without reliance on U.S. assistance.”91 According 
to his assessment, better and more defense technology was required not just for the United States 
to protect itself, but for its allies to protect their interests. 
During the first year and a half of Reagan’s presidency, Weinberger was able to focus his 
energies on increasing U.S. defense spending and expanding military capabilities. On the one 
hand, he devoted his energies to lobbying Congress for bigger budgets and empowered the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff to request their dream procurement lists. On the other hand, he approached the 
Falklands War from the single-minded perspective of arming an ally with hardware and 
intelligence without regard for diplomatic consequences. For Weinberger, and likely Reagan at 
the start of his presidency, this is how America was to achieve “peace through strength.”  
The twin crises of economic recession and the Israeli invasion of Beirut in mid-1982 
forced Reagan to at least momentarily turn away from Weinberger and consider different 
approaches to national security grand strategy. 
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2   Raising the Cap: “Star Wars” – July 
1981 to June 1983 
 
 
 The recession started in July 1981 and recovery did not begin until shortly before January 
1983, when still fewer than 20 percent of Americans thought the economy was improving and 
Reagan’s popularity reached its first-term low of 35 percent.92 Theories of what triggered and 
ended the recession are numerous, and debate over the matter is a fierce battleground in U.S. 
domestic politics as the interpretation is tied directly to Reagan’s iconic legacy. Setting aside the 
gargantuan question of what caused the downturn, it had palpable implications for Weinberger’s 
defense spending lobbying efforts on Capitol Hill. Beginning February 1982, he began reporting 
intense opposition to Pentagon spending proposals due to a “hostile mood toward the whole 
budget, including defense.” Particularly annoying to the Secretary was the Republican leadership 
who believed “that Pentagon spending cuts will erase the large Federal deficit, and that it is ‘only 
fair that defense be cut.’”93  
 Weinberger laid out his new battle plan to Reagan to “reverse this trend” of Congress 
seeking to cut the recently fattened Pentagon down to size. He pledged that he and his deputy 
Frank Carlucci would step up their public appearances detailing the Soviet threat and necessary 
budgetary response, that he would present detailed arguments to five congressional budget 
committees, and that he would host regular Pentagon breakfasts with the Senate defense 
appropriations subcommittee to coax them into setting down their knives. He asked the president 
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to personally intervene with Republican Senator Ted Stevens, who had declined his breakfast 
invitation.94 
 Weinberger lobbied hard to keep his bigger budgets, telling his audience at a National 
Press Club luncheon in March 1982 that the military and defense industry was “the most 
important social welfare program for which our Federal government must be responsible.” He 
warned that cuts in long-term defense programs would compound unemployment.95 In the midst 
of the administration’s July 1982 decision to deploy U.S. Marines to join a multinational force of 
peacekeepers in Lebanon, Weinberger’s top line report item to Reagan was on the “severe 
budget situation” the Pentagon faced in Congress.96 As the recession dragged on, even 
ideologically conservative bulwarks took swipes at Weinberger’s relentless push for increased 
spending. In August, Weinberger flagged for the president the National Journal’s criticism of the 
operational effectiveness the administration’s new defense hardware.97 By January 1983, 
Weinberger was reassuring Reagan that the Heritage Foundation AGENDA 83 report’s attack on 
the size and usage of the defense budget was due to the “inexperience” of the authors and could 
be disregarded.98 
 With Weinberger and the defense spending surge under siege, Reagan eventually turned 
to other advisors for a solution to how he could continue to project military strength to his 
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domestic base and to the Soviet Union. Deputy National Security Advisor Bud McFarlane 
maneuvered to queue up a tailor-made nuclear deterrence pivot in early 1983 that appealed to 
Reagan’s sensibilities, and Reagan ran with it. Within weeks, this idea crystalized in a massive 
research and development program called the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), famously 
derided by its detractors as “Star Wars.” The SDI episode proved to be emblematic of Reagan’s 
approach to grand strategy. His cabinet and White House staff competed in a marketplace of 
ideas and influence, and Reagan went with solutions that best allowed him to project “peace 
through strength” to his domestic audience. Reagan cut key advisors out of the decision-making 
process leading up to the SDI rollout, and this was a tactic he would repeat at other key junctures 
of his presidency. 
 
2.1   Peddling Peacekeepers: Countering the Nuclear Freeze Movement 
 Reagan and Weinberger did not only face a recession obstacle to their defense spending 
designs. On top of the economic downturn, an international nuclear freeze movement gained 
substantial momentum in the United States during the spring of 1982. The movement was 
propelled largely by Catholic and Protestant churches and groups. The unifying principle was  to 
pressure governments to pause the number of nuclear warheads at the current level.99 The 
movement gained intellectual heft when George Kennan, Kennedy/Johnson NSA McGeorge 
Bundy, Kennedy/Johnson Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and Nixon Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks (SALT I) negotiator Gerard Smith penned an article in the Spring 1982 issue of 
Foreign Affairs calling on the administration to adopt a “no first use” nuclear policy.100 
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The emergence of these bipartisan ghosts of containment’s past to criticize Reagan’s 
nuclear strategy appeared to galvanize a response from the administration. Weinberger pleaded 
with Reagan in April 1982 to speak publicly and “forcefully” against the nuclear freeze idea.101 
Deputy NSA Bud McFarlane, in a sort of rehearsal for the SDI policy initiative he would soon 
pitch to Reagan, swiftly coordinated a thorough domestic campaign to counter the movement, 
and the Foreign Affairs article in particular. McFarlane’s declassified National Security Council 
(NSC) papers show how his staffer Sven Kraemer secured approval from Reagan’s Chief of Staff 
James Baker to launch a comprehensive public affairs campaign to neutralize nuclear freeze and 
“no first use” sentiment.102 
While it may seem untoward for the NSC staff to run a taxpayer-funded domestic public 
relations campaign to convince Americans they needed a particular form of nuclear deterrence, 
McFarlane makes no secret of the campaign in his memoir. He boasts without regret that “over 
the course of 30 days, we found that in fact we had effectively begun to counter the freeze 
movement. We did it by depth of persuasion. It was not dirty tricks. It was engagement, giving 
the public the information it needed to understand our point of view. And it worked.” 
For the most part, McFarlane’s memoir and declassified papers tell similar stories. 
McFarlane’s staff compiled a briefing book based on Weinberger’s talking points and their own 
research. McFarlane, his team, and other senior national security officials  then fanned out state-
by-state for a total of “85 appearances… in the 12 major media markets of the United States” in 
early autumn 1982103 McFarlane did leave out of his public narrative a concerted effort by NSA 
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Bill Clark and NSC staffer Paul Bremer—who later became Iraq’s chief executive authority after 
the 2003 U.S. invasion—to privately persuade the U.S. Catholic ecclesiastical hierarchy to drop 
the nuclear freeze movement and support a nuclear buildup.104 NSC staff argued that the Soviets 
had gained a substantial nuclear edge over the United States during the previous years of détente.  
Clark wrote a letter to Cardinal Joseph Bernardin, who had just become Archbishop of Chicago 
in August, urging him to put a damper on the nuclear freeze movement and to redirect Catholic 
opinion against the socialist Sandinistas of Nicaragua.105  
McFarlane also left the names of Republican electoral operatives out of his memoir 
depiction of the counter nuclear freeze campaign.106 McFarlane chaired an August 25, 1982 
Arms Control Public Affairs meeting to plan the monthlong campaign, where two of the eight 
participants were perennial Republican campaign strategists Lee Atwater and William Greener 
III.107 Atwater’s boss at the time, Reagan’s Director for Political Affairs Ed Rollins, 
characterized Atwater as an “Oliver North in civilian clothes” who had “no rules or standards in 
[his] operating manual” and would “do anything to win.”108 The day after Reagan’s 1984 
election victory, Atwater moved from his position as deputy presidential campaign manager to 
become a full partner at the consulting firm Black, Manafort and Stone, alongside Paul Manafort 
and Roger Stone, recently famous for political operations related to the 2016 presidential 
campaign. One of their largest clients in 1985 was Rupert Murdoch’s The News Corp. Ltd., an 
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indicator of Atwater’s demonstrated value as an invaluable media influencer.109 Bill Greener 
planned and executed an additional public affairs campaign in the spring of 1983 in coordination 
with the NSC promoting Reagan’s increase of the defense budget.110 Greener worked with 
Manafort for four decades, had a planning role in every post-Reagan Republican convention, and 
served as executive director for public events and ceremonies for the 2017 presidential 
inauguration. Defense spending remains a pillar of his political clients’ media messaging.111 
 In spite of these NSC and party operative tactics, Weinberger foundered in his 
congressional lobbying initiatives as the recession wore on. He had a particularly difficult time 
attempting to secure congressional approval for basing of MX Peacekeeper missiles, the land-
based element of America’s “nuclear triad” of intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear subs, 
and bombers.112 The sticking point, even for congressional allies of Weinberger, was where and 
how to base the MX missiles, especially given the nuclear freeze movement and voter concerns 
about their neighborhoods becoming a nuclear first strike target of the Soviets. In March 1982, 
Weinberger informed the president that Republican congresspeople requested declassification of 
Soviet threat material so they could demonstrate to their constituents that the threat required 
domestic missile basing.113 In June he implored the president to “coordinate” the 
administration’s MX position across departments and agencies, and identified Senator John 
Heinz as a lobbying target of opportunity.114 The following month he assured Reagan that the B-
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1 bomber was ahead of cost and scheduling targets in time to strengthen America’s hand in arms 
control negotiations, but that clear advocacy guidance on the MX to congressional allies was 
required to rescue that particular program.115 
Although Weinberger informed Reagan in July that the House approved MX production, 
from that point on he underreported the reality of his congressional budgetary struggles.116 Bud 
McFarlane’s memoir chronicles how Congress had rejected two separate MX basing proposals 
before December 1982, and pins blame for this administration failure squarely on the shoulders 
of Weinberger. McFarlane quotes Senators Sam Nunn of Georgia, Bill Cohen of Maine, and 
John Tower of Texas as saying any MX basing initiative put forward by Weinberger would fail 
because “he was not considered credible on defense issues.” These congressmen informed 
McFarlane that Weinberger’s stubborn advocacy of defense systems criticized even by some 
Pentagon officials undermined his reputation as an evenhanded analyst. McFarlane faults 
Weinberger for his persistent inflexibility and “contemptuous attitude toward the Congress,” 
which certainly comes through in his tenacious weekly reports to Reagan insisting he make no 
compromise with congressional defense spending skeptics and MX opponents in particular.117 
McFarlane’s declassified papers show that he indeed harbored this concern about 
Weinberger’s lobbying effectiveness as events unfolded, not just years after the fact. On 
December 17th, a week and half after both chambers of Congress voted a third time to deny funds 
for the MX missile network, he wrote directly to NSA Bill Clark, alleging that “Cap [is] captive 
of vested interests in a particular system elsewhere,” and beholden to “ideologues with respect to 
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arms control.”118 McFarlane demurred when asked about the former comment in a 2019 oral 
history interview, but the latter comment highlights the gulf between Weinberger and McFarlane 
on grand strategy. This dispute over deterrence would echo in the later conflict between 
Weinberger and Secretary of State Schultz on arms control negotiations with the Soviets.119 
Though there appears to be more to McFarlane’s disapproval, what is clear is that he felt that 
Weinberger was enough of a liability to attaining effective nuclear deterrence capabilities that he 
took the risk of giving Clark, a close ally of Weinberger, written criticism of the Secretary of 
Defense that could have undermined McFarlane’s relationship with the Secretary if Clark had 
shared it.120 
 It was against this background of nuclear freeze and congressional stalemate on the MX 
that Reagan gave his famous “evil empire” speech to the National Association of Evangelicals on 
March 8, 1983.121 In the decades since the speech, it has been widely remembered as a general 
escalation of rhetoric against the Soviet Union that epitomized Reagan’s views of his superpower 
rival. However, the phrase “evil empire” was invoked as part of an explicit call to Evangelical 
Protestants and any other amenable listeners not to join their Catholic and mainline Protestant 
coreligionists in the nuclear freeze movement: 
 So in your discussions of the nuclear freeze proposals, I urge you to beware the 
temptation of pride—the temptation of blithely declaring yourself above it all and label
 both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an 
evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove  
yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil.122 
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Though Reagan’s polled popularity had reached its nadir only a couple of months earlier, 
this public speech from the president made more of a splash than a one-month guerrilla media 
offensive helmed by McFarlane.123 It is very difficult to gauge whether Reagan’s escalation of 
rhetoric and the NSC’s media management would have overcome the twin obstacles to the MX 
of recession and the nuclear freeze movement. These efforts soon proved to be unnecessary. Two 
weeks after the “evil empire” speech, Reagan unveiled a bold new defense project that opened 
the heavens wide to uninterrupted spending. 
 
2.2   The Triumph of Imagination: The NSC Staff’s “Star Wars” Gambit 
  On March 21, 1983, two weeks after the “evil empire” speech, Undersecretary of State 
Lawrence Eagleburger informed George Schultz of an unexpected conversation he had with Bud 
McFarlane. Eagleburger said that Reagan was going to make a speech on March 23 announcing 
an alternative to the flailing MX, a “high-tech strategic defense system that can protect us against 
ballistic missiles and thereby protect our offensive capabilities. Schultz was nonplussed, as he 
and his staff believed that announcing the goal of a nuclear-free world would seriously 
undermine America’s alliance with Western Europe. Schultz met with Reagan later that day to 
urge him to tone down the speech, insisting that the Pentagon did not yet have the technology to 
back the type of research and development to be announced, and that the “revolution in our 
strategic doctrine” communicated in the speech would worry allies who would think the United 
States no longer cared to protect them. Schultz pressed hard with Reagan and the NSC staff for 
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substantive edits, but ultimately the president agreed to only slightly downplay the message that 
this Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) would eventually eliminate nuclear weapons.124 
 Schultz had three main problems with the announcement of SDI in addition to Reagan 
and the NSC staff having kept him in the dark. First, he knew for a fact that the United States did 
not “have the technology” to install “an impenetrable shield” based in space to strike down 
nuclear missiles. He believed that technically this research and development might, at best, yield 
an operable system a decade later. Second, he had serious strategic problems with the proposed 
system, which the Joint Chiefs confirmed would only be able to target land-based missiles but 
would not defend against bombers or missiles launched from submarines. Third, he noted that 
“because the Soviets will see this as an effort to render their offensive capability obsolete… the 
run-up period to deployment will be highly dangerous.” The SDI speech was essentially an 
announcement that the United States intended to eventually discard the 1972 Anti-Ballistic 
Missile (ABM) treaty, a move the Soviets would view as over belligerence, especially in the 
recent wake of the “evil empire” speech.125 
 Weinberger received even shorter notice of the SDI speech than Schultz. In his 1991 
memoir, he praises SDI as a work of strategic genius, yet his annoyance toward his “friends in 
the White House” who informed him of the speech by a “hurried and surreptitious call” the 
morning it was given still resonates. Though Weinberger was traveling in Portugal that day, it is 
likely he would not have learned of the speech any sooner if he had been present in Washington. 
Weinberger attributed the late notification to “a portion of the White House staff… still desiring 
total surprise.” He secured last minute approval from Reagan to inform NATO defense ministers 
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of the immanent change in defense policy. He also underscored the importance of coordinating 
with allies on strategic defense by emphasizing that for allies he did not have time to inform, the 
“displeasure at not knowing about the initiative ahead of time outweighed their appreciation of 
the significance of the new proposal.”126 Weinberger and Schultz’s concerns about allied 
reactions proved to be prescient, as SDI proved to be a bone of contention raised by otherwise 
staunch Reagan supporter Margaret Thatcher, who was skeptical of the missile shield’s 
technological viability and concerned it would weaken the defensive bond between the United 
States and Western Europe.127 
The president had decided that a missile defense shield would replace mutually assured 
destruction as the cornerstone of U.S. nuclear deterrence, and his two ranking national security 
cabinet members had not been informed. How did a sea change in U.S. nuclear deterrence 
materialize without the knowledge of the Secretaries of Defense and State? During the first two 
years of his administration, Reagan relied on his Secretaries of Defense and State to prosecute 
his foreign policy. During that time, the NSC staff played only a bit role, most likely due to weak 
leadership in the NSA role. When Reagan’s first NSA Richard Allen resigned in January 1982 
due to allegations that he received a bribe from a Japanese journalist in exchange for an 
interview with Nancy Reagan, Deputy Secretary of State Bill Clark took his place. Clark was a 
close ally of Reagan and Weinberger and had served as Reagan’s chief of staff when he was 
governor of California. He also brought Bud McFarlane, who was then Counselor to Secretary of 
State Haig, over to the White House as his new Deputy NSA.128 
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Clark worked well with the president and secretary of defense, but he left the details of 
national security policy to the veteran McFarlane.129 McFarlane knew the ins and outs of White 
House, NSC, and executive interagency policy development, and he was not afraid to leave his 
mark on presidential decisions. In a memoir chapter tellingly titled “Making Things Work,” 
McFarlane depicts himself as delivering a concise foreign policy to a White House staff in 
disarray. His assessment of Reagan’s first year was dim. “The first year [was] one of drift, 
reacting to events—generally with success, as luck would have it—instead of planning and 
directing them whenever possible.” He describes how in a meeting with White House staff he cut 
through the foreign policy “naysaying coming from the principals at the table” and enumerated a 
foreign policy of “five components”: 1) strengthen the U.S. economic base to pay for foreign aid 
and defense; 2) “restore” defense capabilities; 3) bolster alliances with Europe and Japan; 4) 
mediate a peace process between Israel and its neighboring Arab countries; and 5) stimulate 
growth in developing countries through “trade, aid, and investment.” McFarlane recorded 
Reagan’s deputy chief of staff Mike Deaver’s response. “I’ll be damned. I think we just got a 
foreign policy.”130 
 It is unlikely that McFarlane captured Reagan’s imagination with his policy memos and 
national security jargon. McFarlane did not really formulate a new foreign policy for Reagan.  
McFarlane’s distillation of Reagan’s gut instinct and actions into bullet points may have made 
Deaver and other staffers feel the administration was more focused, but this approach did not 
alter Reagan’s leadership style. Reagan disparaged the writing style of McFarlane and other 
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advisors who worked on his SDI speech in his diary the day before the speech, making special 
note of the extensive edits he had to make “to change bureaucratic into people talk.”131  
The president did not give the NSC staff the reins of foreign policy upon Clark and 
McFarlane’s arrival. As illustrated in the case of the Falklands War, Weinberger and Haig were 
still the primary players. Historian Andrew Preston highlighted how Reagan’s NSAs lacked a 
“direct, productive relationship with the president,” in marked contrast to their predecessors.132 
However, McFarlane worked tirelessly to generate ideas and policies that would advance the 
president’s—and sometimes his own—national security agenda. In the case of SDI, McFarlane 
and Haig’s successor Schultz agree in their memoirs that Reagan desired to implement some 
kind of a missile shield over the nation ever since he visited the North American Air Defense 
Command (NORAD) in Colorado Springs in 1979 and was shocked to learn that the U.S. 
military had no way to stop incoming Soviet nukes from obliterating American cities.133 
Weinberger maintained that SDI was fully the brainchild of the president.134 But it was 
McFarlane who laid the groundwork for SDI by proposing the underlying technology to the 
president in a careful manner that circumvented his superiors Clark, Schultz, and Weinberger. 
McFarlane tooled his proposal in such close alignment with Reagan’s dream of nuclear abolition 
that the president kept plans of SDI and the rollout speech from Weinberger and Schultz, 
theretofore his closest advisors on national security.135 
 McFarlane laid out a straightforward narrative of how he came to convince the president 
to publicly unveil the SDI concept, and there is little reason to doubt his core narrative. Nitze 
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confirms that McFarlane and Reagan were the key players, and Weinberger and Schultz’s 
accounts, while much less informed and detailed than McFarlane’s, corroborate his story.136 
McFarlane and Clark’s military assistant John Poindexter had lunch with Admiral James 
Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations, early January 1983 to discuss strategic defense alternatives 
to the stalled MX basing configurations rejected by Congress. McFarlane asked Watkins to ask 
his Army, Marines, and Air Force counterparts if they supported the deployment of a missile 
shield to eventually block a Soviet nuclear first strike capability. Watkins reported back that the 
Joint Chiefs were on board.137 
 McFarlane and Watkins orchestrated their pitch to Reagan in a February 11, 1983 
meeting with the Joint Chiefs. McFarlane, perhaps overstating as coincidence that “as it 
happened, Judge Clark was out of the country that day,” sat directly to Reagan’s right and 
chimed in at the conclusion of Watkins’ SDI proposal stating that “new technologies may offer 
the possibility of enabling us to deal with a Soviet missile attack by defensive means.”138 Reagan 
immediately requested that the Chiefs promptly prepare a report to him on how to launch this 
kind of missile shield initiative.  
When McFarlane briefed Clark upon his return the next day, Clark fully recognized that a 
missile shield was firmly part of Reagan’s vision and that he needed to ensure it was actualized. 
Joint Chiefs Chairman Jack Vessey called Clark within 48 hours of the meeting, somewhat 
incredulous, to confirm that Reagan wanted a missile shield proposal from the Chiefs. According 
to Poindexter, “the Chiefs had been thinking about strategic systems” but “the Chiefs didn’t 
know” about the NSC and Reagan’s plans for SDI. Vessey and the other Chiefs had only just 
 
136 McFarlane and Smardz, Special Trust, 224–239. Nitze, Smith, and Rearden, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 400–
403. Schultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 261–264. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, 304–312. 
137 Cannon, Ronald Reagan, 282–284. McFarlane and Smardz, 226–229. 
138 Ibid., 229. 
	 44	
adopted Watkins’ proposal as their own recommendation to the president a week before the 
February 11 meeting.139 Clark confirmed that Reagan wanted a formal report from Vessey, and 
the president had a written proposal by early March.140  
 Even Weinberger, who professed total ignorance of how the SDI speech materialized and 
conspicuously avoided giving any credit to McFarlane, casually mentioned that his “own feeling 
is that the [SDI] issue was finally and completely decided in the president’s mind after a 
meeting… with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on February 11.” In both of his memoirs and other 
statements about SDI, Weinberger claimed to have always fully supported the missile shield 
idea.141 Vessey and Watkins have since insisted that Weinberger politely opposed the Chiefs’ 
support of U.S. investment in ballistic missile defense but told the president that he “should hear 
them out” nonetheless.142 The reasons for Weinberger’s opposition are not clear from documents 
or memoirs, but he may have been unwilling to support the program because it was so far from 
becoming technologically viable. The Chiefs’ claim about Weinberger’s opposition is supported 
by the fact that Weinberger and Schultz were kept in the dark about the March 23rd SDI speech 
until nearly the last moment. In 2019, McFarlane confirmed that Reagan asked him directly and 
specifically to not inform either Secretary of the speech until it was too late to cancel the public 
appearance, as the president believed both men would oppose the initiative unless it was 
irrevocably publicized.143 
 McFarlane shared Weinberger’s view that the defense spending surge was at the core of 
U.S. power projection, but simply believed that Weinberger had undermined the policy with his 
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congressional lobbying failures. McFarlane wrote on December 17, 1982 that the “Senate took 
wise action” when it struck down Weinberger’s MX basing proposal.144 Not only did McFarlane 
believe that Weinberger was not credible as a defense spending advocate, but he was backing a 
strategic concept called “densepack,” that McFarlane found to be a foolish and dangerous 
strategy. Weinberger failed to sell Congress on a Pentagon proposal to base all MX missiles 
within close vicinity of each other so that incoming Soviet nukes would blow each other up when 
targeted at the same location.145 It is perhaps not surprising that McFarlane quickly concocted an 
imaginative nuclear deterrence alternative to the considerably less inspiring defense fantasy 
Weinberger peddled unsuccessfully to Congress. 
 One month later, McFarlane marshalled his staff to draft National Security Decision 
Directive (NSDD) 75 for the president. This policy document outlined a strategy for addressing 
“the existing and projected gap between finite U.S. resources and the level of capabilities needed 
to implement U.S. strategy.” McFarlane’s staff highlighted for the president the need to sustain 
“steady, long-term growth in U.S. defense spending and capabilities—both nuclear and 
conventional.” McFarlane and his staff, like Weinberger, connected spending and capabilities 
directly to global power projection, calling the surge “the most important way of conveying to 
the Soviets U.S. resolve and political staying-power.”146 McFarlane was in line with Weinberger 
in strategic direction on defense spending, but with NSDD-75 he had begun to lay the 
groundwork for a new tactical approach by highlighting the importance of Reagan and 
Weinberger’s defense spending goals in spite of Weinberger’s waning ability to attain them. 
 
144 “Memo,” 17 December 1982, Chron Files Folder 8, Robert “Bud” McFarlane RAC Box 4, RRPL.  
145 McFarlane and Smardz, Special Trust, 223. McFarlane, interview by the author, March 25, 2019. 
146 James Graham Wilson, ed. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, 
October 1986–1989. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Publishing Office, 2016, Document 260, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v03/d260. 
	 46	
 Reagan’s diaries, personal letters, and internal correspondences with advisors do not 
directly reference NSDD-75, or any other “bureaucratic talk” produced by the NSC staff, for that 
matter.147  McFarlane’s triangulation with Jim Watkins of the JCS in the February 11 did 
successfully inspire Reagan to move forward with full enthusiasm on strategic anti-ballistic 
missile defense, although McFarlane’s motivations for announcing SDI were considerably 
different from those of the president. McFarlane claimed that he conceived of SDI as a way to 
tax the Soviet economy through military spending to the breaking point and explained that anti-
ballistic missile defense also could make up for Weinberger’s failure to secure approval for MX 
basing. For McFarlane, SDI itself had no strategic purpose in actual nuclear deterrence, even 
though he presented it to Reagan—through Watkins and the other Joint Chiefs—as a way to 
eliminate nuclear weapons. He told Reagan biographer Lou Cannon that he had developed SDI 
as a bargaining chip to trade away in exchange for USSR nuclear disarmament, as the Soviet 
leadership would panic when they recognized their inability to keep pace with U.S. research and 
development. For McFarlane SDI was a means to the end of bluffing the Soviets off the table, or 
rather, forcing them to the negotiation table.148 
 McFarlane first shaped this narrative for the public more than ten years after the March 
1983 SDI speech, and, without further declassification of official documents, it is not possible to 
verify with certainty if this was his strategic thinking at the time. More than three and a half 
decades later, the United States has yet to develop a working missile defense shield, thus 
McFarlane certainly has a stake in presenting the SDI concept as one he always intended as a 
bluff. It is, however, rather easy to verify that Reagan had a different view of SDI’s purpose. 
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Whether McFarlane’s assessment that SDI was integral to U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiation 
was brilliant foresight or convenient hindsight, Reagan believed that the United States had the 
technological capability to install a missile shield and that this would lead to the elimination of 
nuclear weapons. Reagan’s March 23rd speech rang out with soaring rhetoric about “a program to 
counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive” birthed by 
“technology that spawned our great industrial base and that have given us the quality of life we 
enjoy today.”149 
 The writings of Reagan and his advisors exhibit Reagan’s true belief in the power of this 
technology. Reagan’s September 14, 1982 diary entry bubbles with enthusiasm for “an exciting 
idea that nuclear weapons can be used in connection with Lasers to be non-destructive except as 
used to intercept and destroy enemy missiles fat above the earth.”150 He reportedly echoed this 
refrain on at least one occasion quoting a scientist character played by Paul Newman in Torn 
Curtain (1966), who vowed that “we will produce a defensive weapon that will make all nuclear 
weapons obsolete, and thereby abolish the terror of nuclear warfare.”151 On December 18, 1984 
he quoted himself as telling the Joint Chiefs, “More & more I’m thinking the Soviets are 
preparing to walk out on the talks if we won’t give up research on strategic defense system 
[SDI].”152  
It is possible Reagan could have altered some of these entries years later, but he would 
not have much incentive to feign naivete in negotiations when his supporters could just as easily 
praise him for bluffing the Soviets into giving up nukes. In several letters to personal friends 
written between 1986 and 1988, Reagan adamantly asserted that he never intended for SDI to be 
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used as a bargaining chip, and in one letter stated that his purpose was to “develop a defensive 
shield so effective that we can use it to rid the world once and for all of all nuclear missiles.”153 
He also sticks to the script in his memoir, in cinematic fashion, touting SDI as an antidote to the 
mutually assured destruction approach to deterrence. “It was like having two westerners standing 
in a saloon aiming their guns at each other’s head—permanently. There had to be a better 
way.”154 
Weinberger and Schultz, both writing years after Reagan left office, also maintain that 
Reagan never had any intention of using SDI as a bargaining chip.155 McFarlane later stated that 
he was anxious about “central vulnerabilities of the idea” related to NATO ally perceptions and 
lack of technological preparedness, but that he could not stop Reagan from running with the 
concept from the February 11 meeting through the March speech. McFarlane even let on that he 
had planned for Reagan to use the idea with key congressional figures to forge bipartisan 
consensus on maintaining the defense spending surge.156 McFarlane’s internal White House 
maneuvering in Clark’s absence and without Schultz and Weinberger’s knowledge support the 
implication that he saw SDI as a bluff, first to motivate the president to change strategies on how 
to fuel defense spending, then to put forth an idea of nuclear defense that Congress could not 
politically refuse, and finally to force the Soviets to the negotiation table. 
 Regardless of the competing visions and maneuvers of his advisors, in his March 23, 
1983 speech Reagan put forth his personal idealistic vision of a world where U.S. technology 
and innovation would neutralize all nuclear threats. Reagan wrote in his diary that night that his 
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advisors “seemed to think [the speech] would be a source of debate for some time to come.”157 
The prediction turned out to be accurate. Critics dubbed SDI “Star Wars,” deriding it as the 
fanciful yearnings of a president whose mind was still in Hollywood.158 Four days later, The New 
York Times editorial page issued an opinion piece entitled “Nuclear Facts, Science Fictions” that 
not only dismissed SDI as a “pipe dream,” but quoted a section of his speech back at the 
president highlighting the danger of building an ostensibly defensive system in a world filled 
with offensive weapons, which “can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy and no one 
wants that.”159  
 Speechwriter Anthony Dolan, who penned Reagan’s “evil empire” speech, claimed that 
Reagan himself embraced the “Star Wars” label, since it evoked a film series where the forces of 
good defeat the dark side.160 In this starkly defined cosmic struggle, Reagan’s senior advisors—
no matter how skeptical before the SDI announcement or angry about having been cut out of the 
loop—quickly aligned themselves with Reagan’s new strategy. Though Schultz continued to 
question the technological viability of SDI and potential adverse impact on relationships with 
NATO allies, he admitted that “the extravagant launching of [SDI] gave the proposal a special 
visibility that dramatically caught the attention of the Soviets.” Schultz would later make use of 
SDI to further his arms control aims in negotiations with the Soviets.161 Schultz and his 
colleagues did not realize how volatile the subject of SDI was on the Soviet side. Twenty years 
later, Soviet arms negotiator Oleg Grinevski wrote how Premier Yuri Andropov interpreted SDI 
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as confirmation that Reagan had “embarked on a sudden application of a nuclear attack on the 
Soviet Union, and now they are trying to protect the U.S. from our retaliation.”162 
Weinberger labelled Nitze “one of the strongest opponents of SDI,” but details only a 
non-confrontational academic proposal of metrics that would disfavor SDI in lieu of any effort to 
directly contradict the president’s strategic vision.163 Nitze scrubbed any hint of his opposition to 
SDI from his memoir, in contrast to his sharp criticism of Johnson’s handling of the Vietnam 
War. Writing on the heels of Reagan and Schultz’s successful series of arms control talks, he 
disavowed any notion that he was opposed to the strategic concept of SDI and states that he 
simply sought for it to be developed in a cost-effective manner.164  
Although Weinberger himself initially opposed strategic missile defense in the February 
11 Joint Chiefs meeting, he became a vociferous advocate of SDI, pressing for continued 
investment in the program as late as 1991, when he called it “the single strategic concept that 
offers the most hope to the world since nuclear weapons were first deployed.”165 Whether or not 
Weinberger’s faith in SDI as a strategic concept was genuine, he certainly saw its value in 
buoying his defense spending requests. He immediately created a Strategic Defense Initiative 
Organization (SDIO) within the Pentagon that reported directly to him, both to foster prestige 
and visibility for the program and to prevent other DOD units from diverting appropriated SDI 
money. He attempted to secure FY 1984 funds for SDI following the speech but was blocked by 
Congress. Weinberger managed to appropriate large additional sums for DOD earmarked for 
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SDI: $1.4 billion in FY 1985, $2.67 billion in FY 1986, $3.27 billion in FY 1987, $3.6 billion in 
FY 1988, and $3.74 billion in FY 1989.166  
Weinberger had hit a fundraising wall with MX basing, but SDI harvested resources that 
continued to grow even after he resigned from his position in 1987. The Secretary of Defense 
published a second and final edition of Soviet Military Power early in 1983. At the time, he 
presented it to Reagan as an annual publication informing Congress and voters about the need for 
spending to counter the Soviet military threat. His last mention of this fundraising strategy to 
Reagan was two weeks before the SDI speech.167 It is likely that the defensive “Star Wars” idea 
did more for Weinberger’s defense spending efforts than threat promotion ever could. McFarlane 
may have executed an end run around Weinberger to secure more influence with the president in 
matters of defense policy, but Weinberger made the most of the strategic shift and embraced the 
budgetary injection. Although it was formulated by Weinberger’s soon-to-be grand strategy 
rival, SDI helped empower him to continue to focus on defense spending and to counsel against 
troop deployment. 
The SDI episode showed Reagan that the NSC staff could formulate creative solutions to 
thorny political problems like recession pressure on defense spending and the nuclear freeze 
movement. McFarlane gleaned “the need for secrecy in launching any fundamental reorientation 
of policy” as the “vital lesson” of SDI. In a rather visceral description of the policy creation 
process, McFarlane wrote that the “premature disclosure of our planning for SDI would have 
evoked such a storm of criticism as to assure its abortion.”168 It is remarkable that when 
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McFarlane wrote this and when he held fast to the same lessons nearly verbatim in a 2019 
interview, he highlighted the importance of the president keeping key cabinet officials—not just 
the press—in the dark regarding a monumental pivot in national security strategy.169 Ironically, 
within the year Weinberger would employ similarly secretive tactics against McFarlane to 
prevail in an ideological showdown over deployment of U.S. troops in the Middle East. 
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3   Cap the Knife: “Only the Fun Wars” – 
June 1982 to November 1985 
 
 
 Weinberger was initially skeptical about the technological feasibility of SDI and annoyed 
about having been kept in the dark about the program’s rollout, but he came around to Reagan’s 
new strategic approach to nuclear deterrence. McFarlane’s creative mechanism for perpetuating 
the defense spending surge and taxing the Soviet defense economy allowed Weinberger to keep 
ladling cash into defense programs and technology. Both Reagan’s supporters and detractors 
frequently point to the administration’s defense spending power projection and depict 
Weinberger as the administration’s arch-hawk. The defense secretary’s role in Reagan’s troop 
deployment decisions during the Beirut and Grenada crises, however, display an often-
overlooked aspect of Weinberger’s grand strategy and its influence on Reagan. While 
Weinberger sought to maximize defense spending, he exercised consistent restraint in 
deployment of U.S. troops. “Cap the Knife” was no longer thrifty with budgets, but he was 
ruthlessly stingy when it came to utilization of troops. 
   Matters in Beirut and Grenada both came to a head the weekend of October 21–23, 
1983, and Reagan could no longer rely on defense spending and SDI buzz alone to meet his 
power projection needs. A close look at documents, memoirs, and an oral history of Reagan’s 
Beirut and Grenada troop deployment decisions show that if these two crises had not converged 
simultaneously, and if Weinberger had not persistently and dogmatically adhered to restraint, 
Reagan’s foreign policy may have taken a very different course. 
 Reagan acted quickly to invade Grenada, but ultimately decided to pull U.S. Marines out 
of Beirut in early 1984 and not put American combat troops back on the ground for the 
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remainder of his presidency. Weinberger praises both of these decisions in his memoir, and 
claims—erroneously, in the case of Grenada—that he supported both decisions when Reagan 
made them. McFarlane and Schultz praise Reagan’s decisive action in Grenada as masterful 
power projection but blame Weinberger for actively undermining diplomatic successes in 
Lebanon by fatally restricting utilization of American troops abroad. 170 
Weinberger would probably not disagree with their characterization of his refusal to 
cooperate. He was fundamentally at odds with both Schultz and McFarlane over how troops 
should be used, and he made no secret that he thought Schultz and McFarlane’s strategies of 
mixing military and diplomatic tactics were seriously misguided.171 Weinberger went to great 
lengths—including countering his national security colleagues through subterfuge—to apply his 
dogmatic restraint consistently throughout his tenure at the Pentagon.  
For a period, Reagan explored Schultz and McFarlane’s more liberal utilization of troop 
deployment to project power during the Beirut conflict. By 1984, however, Reagan emerged 
from the Beirut and Grenada conflicts firmly in Weinberger’s camp. U.S. ground troops were out 
of the Middle East, and the administration instead focused its power projection directly at the 
Soviet Union in the form of intermediate-range Pershing II missiles deployed in West 
Germany.172 The successful show of force in Grenada, the SDI-enabled defense spending surge, 
and deployment of missiles on the Soviets’ doorstep allowed Reagan to project “peace through 
strength” to American voters in the midst of retreat from Beirut. Withdrawal from an intractable 
conflict ensured that continued American losses in Lebanon would not encumber his presidency 
as the Vietnam War had done to his predecessors. 
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3.1   Strength through Troop Presence: Beirut – June 1982 to October 1983 
 Alexander Haig attributed his demise as Secretary of State to his failure to deliver a 
negotiated agreement to end the Falklands War. The Falklands brought Haig a step closer to the 
precipice, but it was Israel’s June 6, 1982 invasion of Lebanon very soon after that opened 
irreparable rifts between Haig and Weinberger, and Haig and the president.173 Weinberger, as in 
matters of defense spending and troop deployment writ large, held onto an unwavering, dogmatic 
approach throughout the conflict. He subordinated the Lebanon conflict to his Soviet-focused 
Cold War power projection aims. Prioritizing global U.S.-Soviet competition led Weinberger to 
two principles that undergirded his actions and statements. First, Weinberger sought to avoid 
alienating Arab nations for fear that they would re-align with the Soviet Union or reinstitute an 
oil embargo. McFarlane has since made the credible argument that this fear froze Weinberger in 
a belligerently anti-Israel posture.174 Second, and more importantly, Weinberger blocked 
deployment of troops at every juncture because he did not believe that his national security 
colleagues had a defined mission that furthered U.S. interests.175 
 Haig, like Schultz and McFarlane after him, believed that the United States could make 
the most of a horrific situation to build a lasting peace in the Middle East upon Israel’s 
impending defeat of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).176 Some press outlets 
understandably misunderstood the difference between Haig and Weinberger to hinge on support 
for or opposition to Israel.177 Weinberger fed into this narrative by publicly comparing Israel’s 
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role in the Lebanon war to that of U.K. antagonist Argentina in the Falklands War in a televised 
June 20 condemnation of Israel. This directly contradicted Haig’s neutrality-focused news 
conference the previous day.178  
Interpreting the ideological clash of Reagan’s national security titans as one over Israel 
policy overlooks the commonalities between the State-Defense struggles over the Falklands and 
Lebanon wars. In each case, the Secretary of State—first Haig and later Schultz—endeavored to 
conduct shuttle diplomacy between sides to broker a lasting peace agreement. They followed 
what Brands labeled the “heroic statesmen” path blazed by Henry Kissinger in the Nixon and 
Ford years.179  
Weinberger, on the other hand, adhered to his parallel strategies of unrestrained 
armament and highly restrained troop deployment. In both the Falklands and Lebanon, this 
orientation guided him to block U.S. troop involvement as much as possible, and to seek to arm 
whichever side he considered more of a U.S. ally at the moment. Because of his advocacy, the 
United States provided technology, equipment, and support to the British in the Falklands war 
against Haig’s wishes. Schultz complained in exasperated tones that Weinberger proposed 
selling tanks to Saudi Arabia over breakfast in August 1982 in the midst of the Lebanon crisis. 
Schultz was “incredulous at the disruptive timing of the idea,” and believed this action would 
have pushed Israel out of negotiations and into further belligerence. Schultz humorously 
describes “listening and eating my eggs for fifteen minutes” while Weinberger delivered his tank 
proposal before he looked up and shut him down. “Cap, I find everything you said 
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incomprehensible.”180 Their relationship did not improve over their following years of shared 
federal service. 
Weinberger’s playbook on Lebanon mirrored his Falklands tactics. Schultz was a more 
formidable internal adversary than Haig, however. This was mostly due to Schultz’s maintenance 
of a uniquely positive relationship with Reagan throughout his tenure. Haig, on the other hand, 
had been on thin ice since would-be assassin John Hinckley Jr. shot Reagan in March 1981. Haig 
infamously told the press, “As of now, I am in control here,” a statement far out of line with 
constitutional protocol regarding delegation of presidential authority.181 Haig groused in his 
memoir about “gorgeous” leaks from White House staff complaining that his Falklands 
diplomacy efforts constituted “grandstanding” and that he had “even stolen the limelight” from 
Reagan.182 In June 1982, NSA Bill Clark confided in his deputy McFarlane that Haig had run 
afoul of Nancy Reagan regarding some “matters of protocol” on a European trip during the 
outbreak of war in Lebanon, and that the relationship between Secretary of State and President 
was “the worst [he’d] ever seen.” McFarlane wrote that although he was “torn” because Haig had 
been his “sponsor” throughout his diplomatic career, he recommended to Clark that the president 
replace Haig with George Schultz, Nixon’s former Secretary of Treasury.183 
Regardless of whether Reagan agreed with his leaky staff about Haig’s Falklands 
performance or whether discourtesy toward the First Lady amped up the friction, Haig sealed his 
fate with an act of insubordination upon returning to Washington during the opening week of the 
Lebanon war. By his own admission, on Saturday, June 12, Haig issued orders—without the 
requisite presidential permission—to the U.S. Middle East peace envoy to demand that all 
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foreign forces withdraw from Lebanon. The orders included geographic specifics, and Haig 
transmitted the instructions even though NSA Bill Clark explicitly told him that Reagan wanted 
to wait until Monday to discuss strategy with his full national security team. Haig justified his 
actions with a claim that Clark was pulling a fast one on Reagan—presumably on behalf of his 
California ally Weinberger—and that Haig’s actions were meant to help the president regain 
control of his own policy. Haig’s own version of events included his phone call to the president 
in which Reagan withheld approval for issuing the orders, but Haig plowed forward anyway.  
It was not a surprise to anyone except Haig himself when on June 25, within a few weeks 
of the end of the Falklands war and the beginning of the Lebanon war, Reagan accepted what 
was probably an insincere resignation offer by Haig. The same day, while a smarting Haig 
drafted a retroactive resignation letter protesting the administration’s foreign policy, Reagan 
publicly announced that Haig resigned, and that George Schultz agreed to take his place.184 
 Reagan had followed Nixon’s advice and delegated power over foreign policy to his 
Secretaries of State and Defense during the first year and a half of his presidency. Having 
removed his Secretary of State less than three weeks into a metastasizing war in the Middle East 
involving a host of states that the United States viewed as important allies—Israel, Lebanon, 
Saudi Arabia, and Egypt—Reagan at last waded into foreign policy decision-making. As Haig 
bitterly pointed out in his memoir, Reagan ultimately enacted the Lebanon policy Haig himself 
had previously tried to push through without the president’s approval.185 The difference was that 
it was now apparent that Reagan, not the exiled Haig, was “in control here.”  
Haig, working remotely in an advisory capacity until Schultz’s mid-July confirmation, 
proposed that the United States send troops as part of a multinational force (MNF) to support the 
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Lebanese government against pressure from Israel, Syria, the PLO, and other foreign forces. 
Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs opposed the scheme, in part because the Secretary of Defense 
felt that the mission was not narrowly defined and attainable. On July 3th, Reagan approved the 
deployment of U.S. Marines to staging positions near Lebanon.186 This was the deployment that 
Weinberger, probably nonplussed about having lost the troop presence battle to an already 
vanquished Haig, buried beneath his priority issue of the “severe budget situation” in 
Congress.187 
 Deployment of combat troops to achieve a foreign policy goal may have been closer to 
Reagan’s gut national security instincts than Weinberger’s mode of restraint. Reagan did not shy 
away from calling for troop deployment in his pre-presidential mode of criticizing sitting 
presidents as weak. In October 1965, Reagan proclaimed, “We should declare war on Vietnam. 
We could pave the whole country and put parking strips on it and still be home by Christmas.”188 
According to Reagan’s Deputy Chief of Staff Mike Deaver, when Haig wielded nearly identical 
rhetoric in an early 1981 proposal to invade Cuba to counter subversion of allied governments in 
Central America, it “scared the shit out of Ronald Reagan.” Haig’s request to “give [him] the 
word” to “make that island a fucking parking lot” did not convince Reagan to move beyond 
covert operations in Latin America and the Caribbean.189  
It is unclear whether having taken the actual reins of executive power modified Reagan’s 
military intervention calculus, or if he found the rhetoric distasteful when trumpeted by Haig in 
particular. Haig’s tone and patent ambition to run foreign policy—and possibly one day the 
White House—may have induced Reagan to rethink his past views on deployment of combat 
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troops. McFarlane, by no means one to shy away from recommending use of combat troops, 
recalled how he and State Department colleague Paul Wolfowitz tried to convince Haig to 
moderate his “passionate” views on invading Cuba. Haig dismissed their carefully constructed 
risk assessment as “bureaucratic pap” and a “cookie-pushing piece of junk.”190 He had managed 
to alienate even his ideological and institutional allies. 
Weinberger told the president when Haig made his Cuba proposal that he agreed a better 
executed Bay of Pigs-style invasion “might have a satisfactory result.” However, one of the 
“principal lessons” the defense secretary had learned from the Vietnam War was that American 
public opinion would not support such an action unless they were “convinced that our national 
interests required, indeed demanded, that we go to war.”191 It is not surprising that Reagan sided 
with Weinberger over Haig on Cuba in 1981, especially given that even Haig’s own staff could 
not bring themselves to support their boss’s Bay of Pigs redux. The Secretary of Defense’s 
argument stuck to the “peace through strength” script, and Reagan stayed on this path until the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon and removal of Haig.  
George Schultz, unlike Haig, diplomatically marshalled his reinvigorated State 
Department staff and NSC staff—including McFarlane, Eagleburger, and Wolfowitz—to 
develop dispassionate proposals for integrating U.S. combat troops into a peace plan for Lebanon 
and the Middle East as a region. Reagan unleashed Schultz and McFarlane as his heroic 
statesmen, their diplomatic efforts underwritten by U.S. soldiers. In mid-August, 800 U.S. 
Marines joined 1200 Italian and French soldiers overseeing the orderly retreat of the PLO to 
ships en route to Tunisia.192 
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Just as Weinberger invoked Vietnam when arguing against sending combat troops to 
Cuba, the Vietnam War loomed large in Weinberger, Schultz, and McFarlane’s interpretations of 
the 1982 Lebanon war. Reagan’s advisors were very aware of Reagan’s political focus on 
breaking the “Vietnam syndrome,” a promise he laid bare in his August 18, 1980 campaign 
address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) Convention in Chicago. The VFW had broken 
an 80-year precedent to endorse Reagan for president, and he understood his audience. He 
defined the “Vietnam syndrome” as the belief that peace would come in Vietnam, and in other 
areas of conflict if America “would simply stop interfering and go home.” The “lesson for all of 
us in Vietnam,” the president noted, was that we must “have the means and the determination to 
prevail” in armed conflict. Reagan presented an “alternative path” to the “dangerous isolation” of 
Jimmy Carter: “peace through strength” built on a defense budget that would restore a “vital 
margin of safety.”193  
Reagan’s principal lieutenants all were in agreement on growing the defense budget but 
differed on what it meant to have the “means and the determination to prevail.” McFarlane 
believed that the U.S. failure in the Vietnam War was that President Johnson did not “define the 
problem…for the American people, define the political and military strategy for solving that 
problem, and develop popular support for that solution.” In the same vein as Nitze, he believed 
that it was every administration’s responsibility to develop effective grand strategy and lead the 
American public in that direction, rather than letting political consideration and concerns about 
votes determine strategic direction. McFarlane was particularly fixated on the media portrayal of 
the 1968 Tet offensive, which he characterized as “an enormous defeat for the north” that the 
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media misinterpreted for the American public, with disastrous results for the U.S. war effort. 
During his time at the NSC, McFarlane made media management—through a balance of media 
engagement and deliberate secrecy—a central focus of his strategic efforts, evidenced in his 
campaign to counter the nuclear freeze movement, the SDI rollout, and later the invasion of 
Grenada.194  
Schultz was also keen on eradicating the Vietnam syndrome. Summing up his speech at a 
1984 Trilateral Commission meeting, he lamented in his memoir that “the lesson of Vietnam was 
continually being cited to reject any use of military force unless in exceptional circumstances and 
with near total public support in advance.” That same year in October, Schultz again diminished 
the importance of public opinion in national security policymaking during a speech at Park 
Avenue Synagogue in Manhattan. “The public must understand before the fact that occasions 
will come when their government must act before each and every fact is known—and the 
decisions cannot be tied to the opinion polls.” On April 29, 1985, the tenth anniversary of South 
Vietnam’s final defeat at Saigon, Schultz gave a public speech in the State Department lobby, 
where he said that for Vietnam “the true horror had come with the Communist takeover, as the 
24 million people of South Vietnam became victims of a totalitarian state.” He went on to 
categorize the subsequent Khmer Rouge genocide in Cambodia as a direct result of that takeover. 
Schultz emphasized the “mistakes in how the war was fought” but affirmed that “the morality of 
our effort [in Vietnam] must now be clear.” Schultz put it plainly that these were the lessons that 
guided his own foreign policy. “This is not merely a historical exercise. Our understanding of the 
past affects our conduct in the present, and thus, in part, determines our future.”195 
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Schultz delivered these statements about Vietnam and military force shortly after Reagan 
withdrew U.S. Marines from Beirut in early 1984, but this strategic thinking was reflected in his 
actions throughout U.S. military involvement in Lebanon. Regardless of U.S. public opinion, 
Schultz believed “Diplomacy could work these problems most effectively when force—or the 
threat of force—was a credible part of the equation.”196 Unlike McFarlane, he did not express a 
desire to shape media messaging in a hands-on manner. Rather, the Secretary of State wanted to 
include military force as part of his diplomatic toolkit, much like Kissinger did in his 
negotiations with North Vietnam. The presence of U.S. troops in a conflict zone was a lever that 
Schultz sought to use in achieving diplomatic goals.197 While he did not operate in secrecy like 
Kissinger and McFarlane, neither did he have the autonomy or power that Kissinger wielded in 
the Nixon administration. 
Schultz continually contended with Weinberger, who held fast to a belief that the means 
to prevail hinged on public opinion, which was directly correlated with having a defined and 
attainable military objective that clearly supported U.S. interests.198 Weinberger was a fervent 
anti-Communist and much more supportive than Schultz of CIA Director Bill Casey’s covert 
operations in Latin America, which Schultz felt constantly undermined his diplomatic efforts in 
that region.199 But while Weinberger supported unrestrained covert—and often violent—
disruption of regimes friendly to the Soviet Union, he fervently opposed what he called an 
“intermixture of diplomacy and the military.” Putting troops in “impossible” situations not only 
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endangered U.S. troops, but soured public opinion on administrative national security objectives. 
Weinberger felt that he was continually shutting down “wild adventures” proposed by McFarlane 
and the NSC staff, including a scheme to invade Libya in a joint operation with Egypt.200 The 
Libya-Egypt episode does not appear in currently declassified documents and McFarlane does 
not mention it in his memoir written three years after Weinberger’s, but neither does he refute 
the claim in the manner that he takes issue with many of Weinberger’s other statements.201 
In July 1982, Reagan gave the order to install a U.S. troop presence in Lebanon. He did  
so over the objections of Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs that U.S. involvement did not pass the 
U.S. interests test.202 800 U.S. Marines arrived at port in Beirut on August 25th and oversaw the 
peaceful evacuation of PLO leader Yasser Arafat and 8500 PLO personnel.203 On September 1, 
Reagan unveiled a detailed Middle East peace plan developed by Schultz, McFarlane, 
Eagleburger, Wolfowitz, and their cohort. The president called for a “fresh start” in the Middle 
East, endorsing 1) a five-year period of full Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza; 2) 
“immediate adoption of a settlement freeze by Israel”; 3) eventual negotiated governance of 
West Bank and Gaza divided between Israel and Jordan, not an independent Palestinian state; 
and 4) integrity of Jerusalem as a unitary city and preservation of Israel’s security.204 Schultz and 
McFarlane believed this peace plan was predicated on U.S. military presence in the region, and 
for the time being, the president was on board.205 
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 Polls in the early 1980s pointed to American voters’ high level of interest in the Arab-
Israeli conflict. In October, 86 percent of American respondents agreed with the statement that 
Israel was “a small, courageous, democratic nation which is trying to preserve its independence.” 
While the phrasing of the Israel poll question was leading, the overwhelmingly positive response 
indicates public focus on the region. Voters also exhibited sensitivity to oil price spikes resulting 
from geopolitical developments like the 1973 OPEC oil embargo, the 1979 Iranian revolution, 
and the 1980 start to the Iran-Iraq War. A late 1981 poll showed that American participants listed 
Saudi Arabia and Israel as the two most important nations in terms of “American vital interest,” 
polling at 84 and 81 percent respectively. 206  
U.S. media fed into this existing interest in the region by displaying images of human 
carnage in Beirut. Schultz wrote that “the symbol of this war has become the baby with its arms 
blown off.”207 Reagan used that same language in his August 12th diary entry, where he recorded 
that he “used the word ‘Holocaust’ deliberately” to put pressure on Israeli Prime Minister to keep 
“the symbol of his country [from] becoming ‘a picture of a seven month old baby with its arms 
blown off.’” This war provoked American voters’ fears and consciences more than most global 
conflicts, and Reagan agreed with Schultz that it was in America’s interest to seize this “possible 
golden opportunity to make a fresh start toward achieving a long-term settlement of the region’s 
problems.” 208 A July 19th Harris poll found that 40 percent of respondents supported deploying 
U.S. troops to Lebanon, a remarkably high number given post-Vietnam aversion to overseas 
military excursions.209 
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 Weinberger’s floundering defense budget efforts may also have nudged the president to 
pursue a more overt display of power projection. His weekly reports to the president began to 
implore Reagan to intervene directly with key congresspeople on MX basing beginning in March 
1982, reaching a fever pitch in July when he afforded more prominence to the “severe budget 
situation” than his update on U.S. Marine deployment to Beirut.210 Weinberger’s prioritization of 
legislative lobbying could have been a response to Reagan’s direct orders or due to the 
Secretary’s own defense spending fixation. Either way, the reports portended hurdles in the 
administration’s plans for continued expanding its nuclear arsenal. With the administration’s 
“peace through strength” image hampered by the recession-induced budget turbulence and a 
majority of voters concerned about instability in the Middle East, Reagan opted for U.S. troop 
presence in Lebanon. 
 While Schultz and McFarlane endeavored to use the U.S. Marine presence to enforce 
diplomatic decisions and negotiations, Weinberger directed troop movements in a manner that 
limited their mission to the single objective of evacuating the PLO. Although Reagan overruled 
Weinberger’s initial objections and sent troops to Beirut, the president gave him full control over 
the “disposition of troops,” a delegation of authority that flummoxed Schultz. The Secretary of 
State wanted a “more active role” for the Marines than strictly staying in port to escort the PLO 
onto ships. 211 Weinberger denied this request, insisting that the Marines stick to their evacuation 
mission and not enter the city. With the PLO evacuation successfully completed, the Secretary of 
Defense began withdrawal of the Marines from Beirut on September 10th with completion of the 
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withdrawal scheduled for September 16th.212 Schultz and McFarlane adamantly opposed the 
withdrawal. Schultz believed that withdrawal sent “a message of weakness” throughout the 
region, and McFarlane called the order “treacherous” in his memoir.213 
McFarlane recorded that the Marines had all evacuated by September 14th and blames 
Weinberger’s evacuation orders and termination of U.S. troop presence for the violent events 
that ensued. On the 14th, Maronite Christian Prime Minister of Lebanon Bashir Gemayal was 
assassinated in a bomb blast. Two days later, Maronite Phalange militia entered the Palestinian 
refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila and murdered over 600 unarmed Palestinians including 
children and elderly refugees. With the PLO and MNF gone, the only armed protective presence 
were Israeli forces, who stood by as the slaughter ensued. Reagan was incensed and perplexed by 
the atrocity, asking McFarlane, “What could move people to do something like this?”214 He 
betrayed further surprise and perhaps naivety in his presidential autobiography, admitting that he 
woke up the morning he learned of the massacres expecting “a quiet day” with his Saturday radio 
broadcast the only item on schedule.215 If the president did not expect any events of note to 
follow the assassination of the Lebanese head of state, the conflict certainly proved to be more 
complex that he had first imagined. 
By all accounts, the Sabra and Shatila massacres pushed Reagan firmly in Schultz and 
McFarlane’s corner on U.S. troop presence in Beirut.216 Reagan wrote in his September 19th 
diary entry, “I finally told our group we should go for broke. Let’s tell the people we are in at the 
request of the Lebanese—sending the multinational force [MNF] back in…No more half way 
 
212 Schultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 101–104. 
213 McFarlane and Smardz, Special Trust, 209–210. Schultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 75–78. 
214 McFarlane and Smardz, Special Trust, 209–211. 
215 Reagan, An American Life, 436–437. 
216 McFarlane and Smardz, Special Trust, 209–213. McFarlane, interview by the author, March 25, 2019. Schultz, 
Turmoil and Triumph, 104–114. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, 151–155. 
	 68	
gestures, clear the whole situation while the MNF is on hand to assure order.”217 Weinberger, 
writing with the benefit of hindsight, recorded his and the Joint Chiefs’ opposition to the 
September 29th redeployment of U.S. Marines. He argued that there was no defined mission and 
that the Marines would “almost certainly become embroiled in major combat while 
‘peacekeeping’ between Syrians and Israelis.”218  
Right or wrong, Weinberger’s arguments failed to move the president, who had just 
witnessed a massacre of refugees on the heels of U.S. withdrawal from Lebanon. Reagan, who 
had publicly compared Nixon’s withdrawal from Saigon to appeasement of Hitler at Munich, 
probably had no intention of making himself vulnerable to the same criticism.219 Weinberger’s 
reluctance to deploy American troops probably did not sound like “peace through strength” to 
Reagan. On top of that, Weinberger was failing the president in the Congressional battle over 
domestic missile basing. Reagan turned from his Secretary of Defense to his heroic statesmen 
Schultz and McFarlane to project power through troop deployment. 
 
3.2   “A Shot Heard Round the World”: Grenada – May 1982 to November 
1983  
 
McFarlane and his NSC staff subordinates believed that U.S. troops should be utilized to 
support U.S. political objectives on a global scale, not just in Beirut or the Middle East. He and 
Wolfowitz had applied the brakes to Haig’s Cuba invasion scheme, but McFarlane’s NSC team 
began lobbying the president to intervene in the neighboring island of Grenada as early as May 
19, 1982, when Alfonso Sapia-Bosch drafted an NSC document supporting U.S. removal of 
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Maurice Bishop, the head of Grenada’s pro-Cuba government.220 The NSC staff archives do not 
reveal what factors fed into the timing of Sapia-Bosch’s advocacy for Bishop’s removal, but it is 
likely that the impetus came from internal staff dynamics than any changes in the Grenada’s 
political landscape.221 Bishop was not a new political player in the Caribbean, and he had openly 
established a relationship with Cuba in 1979 when he came to power.222 Sapia-Bosch’s Grenada 
intervention paper trail begins during the Falklands War, when Weinberger was providing 
material support for a British military conflict in the Americas. It is possible that McFarlane and 
his staff believed Reagan might be more open to overt military intervention based on the 
Falklands experience. Within weeks, however, the Israeli invasion of Beirut focused the attention 
of the president and his advisors on the Middle East. 
NSC staff advocacy for intervention in Grenada continued apace. In February 1983, 
Bishop’s government claimed that the United States was planning to invade Grenada, and NSC 
staff tested the idea of disrupting Bishop’s government with the Senate Intelligence Committee. 
Key Senators demurred on supporting of such forward-leaning action, but staff persisted in 
lobbying the president. During his March 23rd SDI speech, Reagan showed a reconnaissance 
photo of an airfield in Grenada allegedly built by Cubans to highlight the Communist threat next 
door.223 NSA Bill Clark wrote a memo to Reagan in May 1983 requesting approval for a “more 
active program to reduce the threat of Maurice Bishop.” Until more documents related to 
Grenada are declassified, it remains unclear how the president responded to this request. No 
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White House files on Grenada after September 1983 are yet available, adding to the murkiness of 
decision-making on the subject.224 
In the decades following his presidency, Reagan and his advisors have put forward a 
consistent narrative of the October 25, 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada. According to this 
narrative, echoed by Bud McFarlane as recently as March 2019, Reagan authorized an invasion 
of Grenada in direct response to the distress call of Grenada’s Caribbean neighbors. Reagan and 
his senior advisors have maintained that the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) 
requested U.S. military intervention on October 23rd, in response to the overthrow of Maurice 
Bishop on October 13th and his eventual murder on October 19th. They explained that to preserve 
operational security, the president kept the mission secret from Congress—and even close ally 
Margaret Thatcher—until the last possible moment.225 White House documents, and even the 
recollections of Reagan’s lieutenants, betray a more complex chronology. In reality, the decision 
to invade Grenada was both well-planned in advance and more contested among Reagan’s 
advisors than any single advisor has explicitly admitted. 
On October 4th, Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 105, calling 
for regional security support for Grenada’s neighbors in limiting the influence of Bishop’s 
government. The directive called for the United States to “maintain sufficient military presence 
in the Eastern Caribbean to deter aggression…and to respond to any such aggression.” There is 
at least one redacted point, likely referring to covert operations. The document ends with a 
remarkably short follow-up window. “The coordinated, diplomatic, military, intelligence, 
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resource, and contingency plans called for in the items above should be forwarded for review by 
the president by October 15, 1983.226 
Over the following two weeks, Grenada exploded into turmoil, culminating with the U.S. 
invasion on October 25th. Government documents from this period remain classified, but 
memoirs provide hints of an unfolding conflict that deviates from the official narrative. On 
October 13th, a military coup overthrew Bishop’s government and put him under house arrest. 
Four days later, Bud McFarlane replaced Bill Clark as Reagan’s National Security Advisor.227 
Reagan had forced Clark’s resignation in the midst of the brewing Grenada crisis, a move Lou 
Cannon attributed to his worsening relationships with Reagan’s White House staff, Schultz, and 
Nancy Reagan.228  
On October 19th, the coup plotters executed Bishop and his key supporters by firing 
squad.229 Weinberger and Schultz both wrote that McFarlane chaired a Crisis Pre-Planning 
Group meeting on October 20th and discussed the use of force. Each presented this as the start of 
contingency planning for potential military intervention to protect regional stability and 
American medical students resident on the island. Both men also point to the unanimous October 
21th decision of the OECS, delivered to the State Department by Prime Minister of Domenica 
Eugenia Charles, as the final push that led Reagan to greenlight the U.S. invasion after he 
received the early morning phone call at the golf course in Augusta in the wee hours of October 
22th.230  
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Bud McFarlane echoed this same narrative of Eugenia Charles’ cry for help and his early 
morning call to Reagan in a March 2019 interview.231 Like Schultz and Reagan, he told the story 
of how McFarlane informed the president that Charles asked the United States to intervene in 
Grenada to protect OECS countries, and how the president made the decision right then to invade 
on the 24th or 25th.232 On the surface, this is true. But this rendition of the decision story omits 
important prelude and postlude. The story is incomplete without mention of the year and a half 
of NSC staff lobbying for intervention in Grenada and the NSDD authorization of still-classified 
action related to Grenada earlier that month.233 Even more immediately relevant to Reagan’s 
decision is McFarlane’s admission in his memoir that sometime between the October 13th coup 
and McFarlane’s assumption of NSA duties on October 17th, he “instructed that [the NSC staff] 
determine whether the other Caribbean states, including Dominica…might be inclined to 
coordinate a call for assistance from the United States that would legitimize our involvement in 
the events occurring in their region.”234 McFarlane orchestrated this call for help before Bishop’s 
execution had taken place.  
There is nothing inherently untoward about building diplomatic consensus to achieve a 
political or military aim, but it does show that the decision to invade Grenada was one developed 
internally within the United States side, not spontaneously solicited by Grenada’s neighbors. 
McFarlane mentions this as a brief aside in his memoir, separated from his core narrative on 
Grenada and the Augusta golf weekend. He begins his description of the Grenada crisis with the 
somewhat misleading statement, “Our intelligence on Grenada was very poor.”235 The NSC staff 
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had tracked Bishop’s government since McFarlane’s arrival, and Reagan referenced Grenada’s 
alleged Cuba connections as a talking point in his SDI speech.236 McFarlane and Reagan’s other 
foreign policy advisors all presented the Grenada invasion as a quick decision in response to an 
OECS distress call, when in fact the NSC staff had advocated for this type of action for quite a 
while. 
Paradoxically, while Reagan and his advisors downplayed the volume of preparatory 
NSC discussion and research invested in the Grenada action, they also overemphasize the 
president’s decisiveness. While memoir accounts point to the October 22th Augusta phone call as 
Reagan’s key decision point, Schutz lets on that “at about six o’clock that Monday evening, 
October 24th, President Reagan gave the final order to proceed.”237 This is a chronological detail 
conspicuously omitted in Reagan, Weinberger, and McFarlane’s accounts.238 This final Grenada 
decision came a day and a half after McFarlane woke Reagan up with news of the Beirut Marine 
barracks bombing.  
Between the initial October 22th decision and final October 24th decision came two 
National Security Planning Group (NSPG) meetings on the 23rd involving Reagan, Schultz, 
Weinberger, Casey, McFarlane, and NSC staff members including Oliver North. The subjects of 
both meetings are recorded as “Lebanon/Grenada,” but other than subject and participant list, the 
meeting minutes remain classified.239 Reagan and most of his advisors separate the president’s 
decisions about how to respond to the Grenada and Lebanon crises, with Weinberger going to the 
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extreme of not acknowledging any chronological connection between the crises.240 Schultz, a 
notable exception, serves up the truth of the matter plainly. “I went right into the Situation Room 
in the White House, where we dealt with both crises—in Beirut and in Grenada—at once.” 241 
In a 2019 oral history interview, McFarlane began to present the crises as separate 
decisions but soon jumped back and forth somewhat erratically between Grenada and Beirut as if 
they were treated as a dual decision. He presented Grenada as an overwhelmingly successful 
projection of American power that sent the Soviet and Cuban allies a clear message. In 
McFarlane’s eyes, Grenada was a model for what Reagan should have done in Lebanon 
following the barracks bombing. McFarlane became visibly agitated when he identified 
Weinberger as the dissenting advisor who implored Reagan to neither use American troops in 
Grenada nor Lebanon. McFarlane said that on October 23rd, Weinberger lost both arguments, and 
Reagan agreed that day to authorize muscular ground troop responses in both Grenada and 
Lebanon.242 
 Schultz’s memoir supports McFarlane’s claim that Weinberger opposed military 
responses in both Grenada and Lebanon. Schultz detailed Weinberger’s “intense” debate on 
October 23rd with the rest of Reagan’s team over Grenada, and his persistent efforts on October 
24th to divert the president from an invasion to mere transmittal of an ultimatum to the coup 
plotters. According to Schultz, Weinberger claimed that the Grenada invasion needed “a much 
larger force before an operation could begin.”243 Schultz and McFarlane have not divulged what 
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ultimately pushed Reagan to give the go-ahead on October 24th to invade Grenada, but both 
made clear that his final decision happened over Weinberger’s adamant protestations. 
 The administration viewed the Grenada invasion as an unequivocal success. Nineteen 
American soldiers, 45 Grenadians, and 25 Cubans were killed, but images like those of 
evacuated American medical students kissing the tarmac upon their arrival in South Carolina 
overwhelmed any visions of death on the airwaves. While the surprise invasion triggered a 
strongly negative reaction from Reagan’s political opponents, including the initiation of 
impeachment proceedings by seven House Democrats, it was immensely popular among 
conservatives and moderates.244 Reagan and his supporters viewed the victory as “peace through 
strength” par excellence. In the words of conservative writer Dinesh D’Souza, “For the first time 
since the Vietnam War, the United States had committed ground troops abroad, sustained 
causalities, emerged victorious and won the support of the American people.”245  
It is telling that Weinberger misleadingly portrayed himself as an unwavering supporter 
of the invasion in his memoir.246 Like D’Souza and other ideologues, Weinberger likely viewed 
the Grenada episode as the solution to the Vietnam syndrome. He was against the invasion when 
the outcome was uncertain. But with a combat win under his belt, another “peace through 
strength” box was checked. Reagan had used ground troops in an apparent resounding victory. 
That proved to be sufficient for his entire presidency. Weinberger did not lose any future 
arguments with his rivals over combat deployment.  
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Schultz called the Grenada invasion “a shot heard round the world by usurpers and 
despots of every ideology,” claiming that “Western democracies were again ready to use the 
military strength they had harbored and built up over the years in defense of their principles and 
interests.”247 Ironically, the opposite happened with U.S. Marines in Lebanon following the 
Grenada episode. Weinberger maneuvered steadily and successfully to convince Reagan to 
withdraw from Beirut by February 1984. Grenada may not have had the global impact Schultz 
claimed, but it did reverberate within the halls and psyches of Reagan and his advisors.  
 
3.3   Missiles for Men: Withdrawal from Lebanon – November 1983 to 
February 1984   
 
McFarlane and Schultz walked out of the October 23rd NSPG meetings believing that 
Reagan had fully resolved to invade Grenada and reinforce U.S. Marine presence in Lebanon. 
McFarlane recounted how Bill Casey gathered an intelligence package over the next few weeks 
that identified an Iranian Revolutionary Guard-supported Shia militant cell in Bekkaa valley as 
responsible for the Marine barracks bombing.248 McFarlane convened an NSPG meeting on 
November 14th and secured Reagan’s approval for a joint retaliatory strike with the French 
scheduled for November 16th.249 
Unexpectedly, the French conducted a November 16th strike on Baalbek, Bekkaa Valley, 
without any help from the U.S. military.  McFarlane was livid in his memoir, growling that 
Weinberger told him on the 16th that he denied Reagan’s request to strike. According to 
McFarlane, “Weinberger launched into a long series of obfuscations about misunderstandings 
with the French and all the things that could have gone wrong with an attack.” McFarlane 
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categorized this as “directly violat[ing] a presidential order” and claimed that Reagan exuded 
bewilderment when he told the president about Weinberger’s apparent insubordination. “I don’t 
understand,” he reports Reagan as saying. “Why didn’t they do it…. We should have blown the 
daylights out of them. I just don’t understand.”250 
Declassified documents from the period support the basic chronology of McFarlane’s 
recollections. The November 14th NSPG meeting indeed dealt with intelligence reports that the 
“Husaynis,” the pro-Iranian group the CIA had blamed for the barracks bombing, were holed up 
in Baalbek, though the minutes do not indicate a decision to conduct a strike against them.251 But 
it is natural that such a sensitive decision is not recorded in the declassified minutes, given its 
sensitive nature. McFarlane’s deputy, John Poindexter, filed away a note from Reagan to top 
NSC staff vaguely referencing a “snafu in communications” related to Baalbek, Lebanon.252 
The most likely origin of this “snafu” was the president himself. In a March 2019 
interview, McFarlane revealed that—years after he wrote his memoir—an unnamed source told 
him that Weinberger secretly called Reagan using the White House East Wing military 
switchboard the night of November 15th and convinced him to cancel the November 16th strikes. 
McFarlane admitted he had monitored the West Wing phone lines to make sure Weinberger did 
not call the president, and that it was plausible that Weinberger outwitted him and got to Reagan. 
This narrative fits with Weinberger’s version of the story, and it was likely that the SecDef took 
direct responsibility for the cancellation order to protect Reagan’s relationships with Schultz and 
McFarlane. McFarlane stated that Reagan lied directly to his face about not knowing why 
Weinberger cancelled the strike, a breach of trust that frustrated McFarlane.253 
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 Why would the Commander-in-Chief lie to one of his own advisors about a decision he 
had the right to make? Further declassification of documents will probably not answer this 
question, since we will never hear the private conversations between Reagan and Weinberger or 
the internal thoughts of the president. One plausible explanation is that Reagan sought out 
McFarlane, Schultz, and Weinberger each for valuable counsel, and he did not want to alienate 
any of them by clearly taking sides with the opposing party on a particular issue. McFarlane and 
Schultz threatened resignation on several occasions over disputes with other advisors. McFarlane 
and Weinberger ultimately resigned from their posts during Reagan’s second term. While they 
both cited personal reasons, there were almost certainly policy reasons that factored into their 
decisions.254 Reagan’s advisors, and these three men in particular, were sensitive to losing policy 
arguments. Reagan chose to tread carefully. In Weinberger, he had a lieutenant willing to take 
sole responsibility for decisions to restrain military action, even to the point of concealing the 
president’s agreement with his decisions. While McFarlane became frustrated with Reagan 
decades after his presidency, this delegation of responsibility to the SecDef ensured that 
McFarlane and Schultz directed their ire toward Weinberger, rather than turn their dissatisfaction 
toward the president. 
 Weinberger persisted in undermining Schultz and McFarlane’s efforts to apply political 
pressure through retaliatory strikes. This enraged both men, as well as Donald Rumsfeld, Gerald 
Ford’s former Secretary of Defense who had taken over for McFarlane as Special Envoy to the 
Middle East. As chief negotiator in Lebanon, Rumsfeld attempted to take the Syrian government 
to task for having shot down two U.S. reconnaissance planes on December 3rd, resulting in the 
death of one American pilot and the imprisonment of another. That same day, artillery fire 
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originating in Syrian-held territory killed eight Marines. By January 1984, Rumsfeld was trying 
to extract concessions from the Syrians in exchange for a pause in U.S. reconnaissance flights. 
After presenting the Syrians with a negotiation proposal, he learned that Weinberger had 
suspended reconnaissance flights on December 18, 1983 without informing State, NSC staff, or 
Rumsfeld. Schultz recounted how this lack of coordination led him to report to the president on 
January 11th, “Don [Rumsfeld] believes…Syrian views on Lebanon appear to have hardened in 
response to domestic criticism of the MNF here and in Europe.”255 McFarlane characterized this 
type of action as deliberate lack of coordination on Weinberger’s part, “so determined was 
Secretary Weinberger’s resistance to any use of force at all.”256 
 In a March 2019 interview, McFarlane faulted Reagan for his inability to develop and 
then zero in on strategic foreign policy priorities. He recalled how upon Reagan’s reelection in 
1984, he submitted a document to the president highlighting twelve key foreign policy objectives 
and asked Reagan to select two or three as his primary focus. To McFarlane’s dismay, Reagan 
returned the document to him with the comment, “Bud, let’s do them all!”257  
 Reagan did have foreign policy priorities, however. They just did not align with 
McFarlane’s. McFarlane believed that American withdrawal from Lebanon set the stage for the 
next three decades of unrest in the region.258 Securing lasting peace and stability in Beirut was 
not an end in itself for Reagan. McFarlane’s analysis was more incisive when he mused about 
the factors pushing Reagan toward withdrawal in February 1984. He admitted that “any foreign 
policy that put lives at risk was not going to make it through the political filter of an election 
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year.”259 Speaking of the Beirut withdrawal to Lou Cannon, McFarlane admitted that a 
presidential election year “does concentrate your mind.”260 
 Ronald Reagan cultivated foreign policy concentration and focus throughout his first 
term. It just was not policy-based. Reagan was intent on crafting a narrative of “peace through 
strength,” and he projected that image to potential voters. His televised speech of October 27, 
1983, shortly after the Beirut bombing and Grenada invasion, illustrates how it was possible to 
apply a military success in one part of the world to another theater where the American military 
had just suffered a bloody massacre: 
 The events in Lebanon and Grenada, though oceans apart, are closely related. Not only  
 has Moscow assisted and encouraged the violence in both countries, but it provides direct  
 support through a network of surrogates and terrorists. It is no coincidence that when the  
 thugs tried to wrest control over Grenada, there were thirty Soviet advisors and hundreds  
 of Cuban military and paramilitary forces on the island…. 
 
 You know, there was a time when our national security was based on a standing army  
 here within our own borders and shore batteries of artillery along our coasts and, of  
 course, a navy to keep the sealanes open for the shipping of things necessary to our well- 
 being. The world has changed. Today, our national security can be threatened in faraway 
 places. It’s up to all of us to be aware of the strategic importance of such places and to be 
 able to identify them.261 
 
The speech outlined no specific policies or commitments. Reagan probably did not know 
throughout 1983 whether he would support Weinberger’s or Schultz and McFarlane’s approach 
to troop deployments, and he betrayed no particular leaning in the speech. But he established that 
success in Grenada also counted for Lebanon, and that all of these engagements were part of a 
global struggle against the Soviet Union. Reagan managed to downplay the link between U.S. 
military credibility and the Lebanon conflict, in contrast to how Johnson, McNamara, and other 
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previous leaders had become convinced that credibility hinged on U.S. victory in Vietnam.262 
Regan prepared his audience to change their definitions of what power projection might mean 
and left the door open for either sending additional troops to Lebanon or abandoning the project 
entirely if it was determined not to be of “strategic importance.” Within four months, Reagan 
chose the latter. 
Reagan’s emphasis of Cuban and Soviet influence in Grenada was probably a significant 
exaggeration of the reality on the ground, based on recently declassified NSC documents. 
McFarlane presented an October 30th “interagency intelligence assessment” on Grenada to 
Reagan that stated only forty Cuban advisors (not hundreds) were present, and that “statements 
by U.S. personnel” (including the president) that “quantities and types of weapons in Grenada 
are beyond what would have been considered necessary for Grenada’s defense [alone]” was not 
supported by evidence in Grenada. Instead, according to this intelligence assessment, “it [was] 
reasonable to believe that the captured arms stocks inventoried to date were intended to ensure 
internal security and to defend Grenada against attack.”263 In a cover letter to the report, 
McFarlane implored Reagan not to let this assessment dissuade him from conviction of Soviet 
involvement. “As you will see, the estimate is very conservative….It seems to me that the 
intelligence community—having been too expansive last week—is now swinging to the other 
extreme….That is too bad….it seems to me that the evidence is there to sustain the judgment that 
the Cuban/Soviet program went well beyond the training of Grenadans for local defense.  I 
would not bother reading any except the highlighted portions.”264 
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Whether Reagan disregarded the actual bottom line of the intelligence assessment 
because of his personal ideological leanings or McFarlane’s advice to “not bother” with the 
details of the report, he continuously held Grenada up as a victory against the Soviets. 
McFarlane, for his part, expressed his own opinion to NSC subordinates Oliver North and 
Constantine Menges that evidence of Cuban and Soviet influence would probably be less 
damning than administration officials had claimed. He recommended to his team that the 
president not “bring all the material captured in Grenada to Washington and display it with press 
coverage,” since “simply laying it out might not be as impressive as a smaller representative 
display together with oral explanations of the scale of operations which could be sustained by 
terrorists.”265 McFarlane took up a tactic that Schultz would soon adopt in marshalling support 
for U.S. military action: pivoting from the threat of Soviet control and invasion to terrorist plots 
by America’s enemies. 
 The day after Reagan’s October 27th Lebanon/Grenada speech, Schultz met with Soviet 
Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin. The two statesmen discussed the United 
States’ planned November 23rd deployment of intermediate-range Pershing II nuclear missiles in 
West Germany. Schultz insisted, “We do not have a policy of confrontation. We can have 
discussions about important problems, but they cannot simply be about arms control.”266 Reagan 
had just spun Grenada as a major victory over the Soviets, and the president and his advisors 
were united in moving forward with the Pershing II’s to project “peace through strength” in 
Western Europe, an area of widely accepted “strategic importance.” Schultz described a “flurry 
of negotiation” with the Soviets in the month leading up to the planned Pershing II deployment. 
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Proposal rejections on both sides yielded no results, and the Reagan administration moved 
forward with missile deployment in West Germany on November 23rd. Soviet negotiators quit 
arms control talks in Geneva to protest the move.267 
 Leaving aside the massive questions of how the Pershing II deployment influenced the 
American public and Soviet government, Reagan was clear in his memoir about how the 
deployment made him feel empowered: 
We had changed the rules of the game. And [the Soviets] didn’t like it. The United States
 was in its strongest position in two decades to negotiate with the Russians from strength.
 The American economy was booming. We’d come a long way since the late seventies,
 when our county was plagued with self-doubt and uncertainty and neglecting our military
 forces. In spirit and military strength, America was back, and I figured it would be only a
 matter of time before the Soviets were back at the table.268 
 
 Reagan’s account of the Pershing II deployment has the ring of a prophecy self-fulfilled. 
During the 1980 election he had foretold the dawning of morning in America and fulfilled 
“peace through strength” in his own eyes with the defense buildup, the launching of SDI, the 
successful ground troop invasion of allegedly Soviet-controlled Grenada, and the deployment of 
nukes on the Soviets’ doorstep. Historian Robert Dean chronicled how masculine identity drove 
American leaders toward irrational and dangerous escalation in the Vietnam War.269 If there was 
a gendered aspect to Reagan’s “peace through strength,” Grenada and missiles displayed enough 
manhood for Reagan’s purposes. He emphasized these victories, and let his advisors fight it out 
on how to proceed in Lebanon. Weinberger’s obfuscations and arguments won the day, and the 
administration quietly relegated Lebanon to the realm of strategic unimportance in the wake of 
multi-party intransigence during Rumsfeld’s failed attempts to negotiate a lasting ceasefire. 
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On February 7, 1984, Rumsfeld informed Prime Minister Amin Gemayel that the United 
States was withdrawing its Marines from Lebanon. That same evening, Air Force One landed at 
Point Mugu Naval Station near Malibu, and Reagan proceeded by helicopter to his ranch. Deputy 
NSA Poindexter distributed copies of a “statement on the situation in Lebanon” to reporters and 
answered questions about “decisive new steps” including “naval gunfire and air support” and a 
presidential request for Weinberger to “submit a plan for redeployment of the marines from 
Beirut Airport to their ships offshore.” Neither the report nor Poindexter used the word 
“withdrawal.”270 
 
3.4   A Syndrome No Longer: The Weinberger Doctrine – April 1984 to 
November 1985 
 
  Even after the February withdrawal from Beirut, Schultz did not give up on his quest to 
leverage U.S. troops as a tool in international negotiations. In fact, his invocation of the 
“Vietnam syndrome” at an April 1984 Trilateral Commission meeting was in part a swipe at 
Weinberger and the Beirut withdrawal. “The lesson of Vietnam was continually being cited to 
reject any use of military force unless in exceptional circumstances and with near total public 
support in advance.”271  
In what was likely a retort to Schultz’s public articulation of troop deployment strategy, 
Weinberger laid out a rubric of restraint in a November 28, 1984 speech at the National Press 
Club titled “The Uses of Military Power.” The speech enumerated six restrictive tests he 
believed leadership should consider before leveraging military force to achieve goals related to 
national interests.272 To paraphrase, the United States should only commit combat troops 
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overseas if 1) the engagement is “vital to our national interest of that of our allies; 2) leadership 
does so “wholeheartedly…with the clear intention of winning; 3) leadership has “clearly defined 
political and military objectives”; 4) the relationship between force composition and objectives is 
“continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary”; 5) “the American people and their elected 
representatives” support the engagement; and 6) it is done as “a last resort.” These tests 
constituted what became known as the Weinberger Doctrine.273 
Conservative New York Times columnist William Safire blasted Weinberger’s speech in a 
December 1984 opinion-editorial titled “Only the ‘Fun’ Wars.” Safire called the Weinberger 
Doctrine and expression of “the world according to the most Vietnam-traumatized elements of 
the Pentagon.” Safire characterized Weinberger’s tests as “stunning” and the equivalent to 
suggesting “we take a poll before we pull the trigger.” “No wonder the epitome of a military 
operation in the mind of Pentagonians has become Grenada, the quick crushing of a lightly gang 
of thugs by a huge task force operating in the dark for a few weeks. Oh, what a lovely war.”274 
Schultz echoed Safire’s sentiment in his memoir, calling the Weinberger Doctrine “the Vietnam 
syndrome in spades, carried to an absurd level, and a complete abdication of the duties of 
leadership.”275 
After Reagan’s painful failures in Lebanon, Weinberger’s advised restraint appeared to 
carry the day over criticism from the likes of Safire. The administration did not use ground 
troops during the three and a half years between the Lebanon withdrawal and Weinberger’s 
November 1987 resignation.276 While Safire, Schultz, McFarlane, and others saw Weinberger’s 
restraint as neglect of America’s security responsibilities, Reagan did not cease delegating troop 
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deployment decisions to his SecDef, likely with full knowledge that he would continue to not put 
troops at risk. 
Schultz recounted how Safire mailed him a copy of his “Only the ‘Fun’ Wars” column 
overlaid with a handwritten note from Henry Kissinger: “Bill – one of your best. We must never 
be in the position where our only options are waging total war or accepting total defeat.”277 
Perhaps Schultz longed for ready access to military tools available to Kissinger during his secret 
negotiations with North Vietnam.278 George Ball, former Under Secretary of State in the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations, detected this impulse in Schultz. Two weeks after Safire’s 
piece repudiating the Weinberger Doctrine, Ball penned a New York Times column lambasting 
Schultz for three recent speeches where he felt “his obsession with terrorism…distort[ed] his 
normally judicious view of the world.”279 Schultz had made terrorism the focus of his arguments 
for U.S. troop engagement in Lebanon, citing the suicide bombings and kidnappings of 
American citizens in as hallmarks of this new threat to national security. Ball, possibly wishing 
that his former bosses had applied some version of the Weinberger Doctrine to decisions 
precipitating escalation of the Vietnam War, warned against counterterrorism becoming a fatal 
ideological blind spot, in the vein of Nitze’s militarized containment or Kennedy era 
modernization theory that helped fuel an increase in U.S. military commitments.280 
Weinberger and Ball make strange grand strategy bedfellows, and it is unlikely they 
would acknowledge much shared affinity between their policy prescriptions. But they differed 
from Schultz, McFarlane, and Kissinger on the lessons they took from the Vietnam War. 
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Weinberger and Ball, for different sets of reasons, believed that the Vietnam War could not have 
been won merely with better tactics. For Weinberger, the key was lack of American public and 
congressional support. That was enough to persuade him to maneuver for withdrawal from 
Lebanon, and to successfully advise Reagan against ground troop deployment for the rest of his 
tenure as SecDef. 
Reagan could have taken a variety of paths coming out of the tumultuous Beirut and 
Grenada weekend of October 21–23, 1983. McFarlane and Schultz had believed that Reagan 
would move with decisive military force in both arenas. After Grenada, they were sure Reagan 
would remain firm in support of a Beirut garrison. McFarlane and Schultz had won the battle 
over Grenada, but Weinberger won the long-term policy war against his heroic statesmen 
adversaries. The Beirut barracks bombing and Rumsfeld’s subsequent negotiation failures soured 
Reagan on long-term military engagements. As long as Weinberger was at the Pentagon, Schultz 
had to conduct diplomacy without ground troops at his disposal. 
In what Weinberger probably saw as an ironic and cruel twist, at the same time Reagan 
adopted the spirit of the Weinberger Doctrine, he also pivoted to Schultz’s diplomatic approach 
to arms control. On January 16, 1984, three weeks before confirming U.S. withdrawal from 
Lebanon, and only ten months after labeling the Soviet Union an “evil empire,” Reagan 
delivered his “Ivan and Anya” speech encouraging Americans to find common ground with 
ordinary Soviets.”281 By November 17, 1985, one year after the Soviets walked out of Geneva 
arms control talks, Schultz led the charge in a reboot of the talks. This time around, Reagan and 
Gorbachev sat down face-to-face.282 
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 When Reagan wrote in his memoir that America had been “plagued with self-doubt and 
uncertainty,” it is possible he was at some level writing about himself.283 Throughout the 
Lebanon conflict, his detached delegation of decisions to bickering advisors reflected, in part, an 
uncertainty about how to wield military power. By his January 1984 “Ivan and Anya” speech, 
however, he had delivered his promised defense buildup, resuscitated the spending surge with 
SDI, and secured a visible ground troop victory in Grenada.284 As Reagan laid out in his October 
27, 1983 speech, he believed the victory in Grenada counted for Lebanon, too. It may be that a 
sizable swath of American voters bought that argument. The word “malaise” is readily used to 
describe the American public’s response to the taking of American hostages in Iran—none of 
whom died—under Carter, but never to the killing of hundreds of American Marines in Beirut 
under Reagan. 
Regardless of whether the American public believed their president was on the road to 
“peace through strength,” or if the Soviet government actually believed Reagan had strengthened 
America’s hand, Reagan himself believed he had done so. Ideologically conservative 
biographers like D’Souza have highlighted the defense spending surge, the defense buildup 
reboot through SDI, and Grenada victory as setting the negotiation table for victory over the 
Soviets.285 These developments probably had a larger influence on Reagan’s own decision to 
negotiate than on the decisions of the Soviets or any other parties. Reagan had done what he 
needed to do to project “peace through strength” to a domestic audience. He could move forward 
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with negotiations armed with talking points about his record to fend off accusations of a march 
toward Munich-style appeasement.  
Perhaps more important than Reagan’s claimed national security accomplishments was 
that he was no longer weighed down by the festering Lebanon conflict. Many commentators and 
historians, whether they are Reagan supporters or detractors, tend to overlook that Reagan’s 
pivot to arms control negotiations happened while he was withdrawing troops from Beirut. 
Reagan and Schultz’s arms control triumphs progressed during a period when Weinberger did 
not deploy ground troops anywhere else in the world. Military restraint was a silent, yet essential 
plank in Reagan’s “peace through strength” platform. During his presidency, this silence 
bolstered Reagan’s image as a strong leader in the eyes of his supporters. Three decades later, 
however, silence on the 1984 withdrawal from Lebanon feeds into incomplete and sometimes 
dangerous interpretations of Reagan’s legacy. It is worth considering how Reagan’s presidency 
might have fared if the U.S. military had remained mired in Beirut.  
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Conclusion: Defense, Uncapped – 1986 to 
Present Day  
 
 
 While Reagan’s advisors fought over the meaning of the Vietnam War to develop and 
support policy recommendations, more recent politicians and analysts similarly leverage their 
own interpretations of Reagan’s legacy in contemporary debates. Many Reagan supporters have 
claimed that Reagan’s defense spending surge, further compounded by SDI, either frightened the 
Soviets into arms control negotiations or stressed the Soviet economy to the point that 
Gorbachev had to pursue arms reductions.286 Those who claim that the spending increase and 
SDI scared the Soviet Union also tend to credit Reagan’s Grenada invasion with the same 
effect.287  
This thesis argues that, regardless of any impact these developments might have had on 
the Soviet Union, they created space for Reagan to negotiate an arms control agreement from a 
position of self-perceived strength and in a manner that satisfied his domestic constituencies.288 
Perhaps most importantly, Reagan had enough confidence in the “peace through strength” 
narrative of defense spending, SDI, and Grenada that he withdrew from a worsening military 
conflict in Lebanon against the protestations of key advisors. This withdrawal and avoidance of 
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subsequent combat troop entanglements, especially when compared with Soviet military woes in 
Afghanistan, was itself a source of strength. 
 
The Triumph of Diplomacy 
 
 Schultz, by contrast, believed that Weinberger’s restraint handicapped his global 
diplomatic efforts. For Schultz, America’s newly strengthened military forces should have been 
used to their maximum, regardless of U.S. public opinion:   
To Weinberger, as I heard him, our forces were to be constantly built up but not used: 
everything in our defense structure seemed geared exclusively to deter World War III 
against the Soviets; diplomacy was to solve all the other problems we faced around the 
world; ‘reasonable assurance’ of support from the American people be obtained? By a 
congressional vote for action against a terrorist group or for a rescue operation for 
Americans in danger? Only if and when the population, by some open measure, agreed in 
advance would American armed forces be employed, and even then, only if we were 
assured of winning swiftly and at minimal cost.289 
 
 Reagan followed the policy of buildup and restraint that Schultz decried, and Schultz was 
forced to use diplomacy without the direct pressure of military presence, “to solve all the other 
problems we faced around the world.” Schultz’s tenure has been widely regarded as successful. 
Most prominently, Schultz and Reagan are remembered for arms control, and the 1987 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in particular. Reagan famously remarked that 
Schultz was carrying out “my policy” on arms control. Perhaps Schultz did not secure these 
achievements in spite of Weinberger’s restraint, but rather because of it. If not for Weinberger’s 
policy of military restraint, Schultz may have spent much more time shuttling across the Middle 
East than to Geneva, Reykjavik, and Moscow to meet with the Soviets.290 
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 Writing his memoir at the start of the Clinton administration, Schultz seethed about 
Weinberger’s refusal to use America’s “constantly built up” forces but praised the general arc of 
Reagan’s foreign policy as a “triumph.”291 Historian James Wilson used the same word to laud 
Schultz, Reagan, Gorbachev, and Vice President Bush for their willingness to improvise on the 
path toward arms reductions.292 Schultz seemed to have believed he and Reagan secured these 
achievements in spite of being denied the tool of robust U.S. military presence. He questioned 
Weinberger’s dogmatic restraint, but not his constant military buildup. Schultz probably believed 
he could have achieved much more if he wielded the military force that Kissinger did under 
Nixon. Nixon himself believed that Reagan’s failure in Lebanon was due to under deployment of 
troops.293 But Schultz could not play the combat troops card because Weinberger believed the 
American public would not support this use of military force. In a twist on Clausewitz’s iconic 
principle, Schultz was denied the use of war as an extension of politics, so he had to secure 
political objectives through diplomatic means.294  
 
Blowback: Covert Action and The Hidden Costs of Spending 
 The administration’s defense spending and troop deployment decisions surely influenced 
Reagan’s confidence and domestic approval of his handling of foreign policy. However, 
Reagan’s grand strategy had many consequences outside the realm of his domestic image of 
strength. Weinberger’s dogmatic emphasis on increasing spending and avoiding unpopular wars 
limited Reagan’s exposure to the Clausewitzian “friction” that combat troop engagements 
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inevitably unearth.295 But conventional warfare does not have a monopoly on the production of 
“friction.” Historian Alan Beyerchen’s interpretation of Clausewitz highlights war’s nonlinear 
and multivariable nature.296 On the eve of the September 11th, 2001 attacks on the World Trade 
Center and Pentagon, Chalmers Johnson warned that the global scope and nature of American 
foreign policy was about to produce deleterious “blowback.”297 Since Reagan was ultimately 
restrained in his usage of U.S. troops, nonlinearity and blowback proceeded from other 
dimensions of his foreign policy, such as covert action. 
 While historian Hal Brands paints a largely positive picture of Reagan’s grand strategy as 
coherent and effective, he takes him to task for his “embrace [of] morally and sometimes legally 
problematic initiatives in the Third World,” which did “more to encourage than restrain the 
threats that would preoccupy the next generation of American policy makers.”298 Brands is not 
alone in nodding to the blowback sown by initiatives like arming Osama bin Laden’s mujahideen 
in Afghanistan, selling arms to Iran in exchange for hostages, and running weapons to 
unpredictable forces in Nicaragua and El Salvador.299 Reagan supporters often argue that these 
initiatives further pressured the Soviet Union to give into U.S. arms reductions demands.300 
 
295 Clausewitz, On War, 121. 
296 Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,” International Security, Vol. 17, 
No. 3 (Winter 1992–1993), 59–90. 
297 Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (New York: Metropolitan 
Books, Henry Holt and Company, 2000), 216–229. 
298 Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy?, 143. 
299 Malcolm Byrne, Iran-Contra: Reagan’s Scandal and the Unchecked Abuse of Presidential Power (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2014). Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin 
Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), 19–186, 520–576. 
Haynes Johnson, Sleepwalking through History: America in the Reagan Years (New York: W. W. Norton and 
Company, 1991), 333–365. Harold Hongju Koh, The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power after the Iran-
Contra Affair (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). Lindsey O’Rourke, Covert Regime Change: America’s 
Secret Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018). Persico, Casey, 394–571. James M. Scott, Deciding to 
Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996). United 
States, President’s Special Review Board, The Tower Commission Report: The Full Text of the President’s Special 
Review Board (New York: Bantam, Times Books, 1987). 
300 D’Souza, Ronald Reagan. Paul Kengor, The Crusader: Ronald Reagan and the Fall of Communism (New York: 
Regan, HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 2006), 146–293. Schweizer, Victory. 
	 94	
However, in-depth analyses of contested “Third World” regions, such as Ahmed Rashid’s 
Taliban, frequently show that the Soviet Union struggled to control local populations regardless 
of U.S. intervention. In the case of Afghanistan, U.S. covert support for mujahideen fed into a 
political and social situation that plagued U.S. foreign policy for decades, to say nothing of 
inadvertently nurturing the eventual perpetrators of the September 11th attacks.301 
 Not only do war and covert action produce nonlinear consequences and blowback, but so 
can the act of defense spending itself, even when the military buildup is restrained in actual 
application as it was under Weinberger. Even if Weinberger and Reagan’s defense spending 
surge contributed in some way to bringing the Soviets to the negotiation table, the massive 
spending increases have had economic, social, and cultural effects outside the narrow bounds of 
foreign policy. Notably, during the first fifteen years of SDI, American taxpayers paid sixty 
billion dollars on anti-ballistic missile defense technology without producing a capable 
interceptor.302 It is more difficult to obtain data about the success of similar research over the last 
twenty years due to the classified nature of the projects, but more than 35 years after Reagan 
unveiled SDI, no American leaders are talking about space technology making nuclear weapons 
obsolete.  
Not only might money spent on defense not yield as valuable an economic or social 
return for the country as investment in other sectors, but defense spending can produce hidden 
negative consequences. Anthropologist Catherine Lutz demonstrates in a study of Fayetteville, 
North Carolina how a community’s economic dependency on a military base can produce 
unintended corrosive effects.303 Taxpayers’ income is diverted to funding military bases, and 
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communities are shaped in ways their members would not likely choose if given a range of 
options.  
While Weinberger and other Reagan advisors claimed spending on defense would 
revitalize the U.S. industrial base and economy, economist Robert Higgs and historian Aaron 
Friedberg have argued that defense spending in the United States and Soviet Union have not 
produced economic recoveries, but instead hinder economic growth and diversity. These 
conservative-leaning scholars stop short of applying their criticisms directly to Reagan, perhaps 
because they supported his taxation and deregulation policies, but the patterns they identify in 
earlier decades come into even sharper relief in the 1980s.304 Several economists and political 
scientists have demonstrated how defense spending decisions and contracts engrave economic 
and social patterns into the nation’s geography that make it very difficult to reduce future 
spending.305 Political scientist Kenneth Mayer effectively debunks myths that blame the defense 
industry for manipulating national security decisions through lobbying and influence peddling, 
but his research further emphasizes the one-way nature of defense spending.306 Once spending is 
authorized, political, economic, and social forces make it very difficult to rewind that 
momentum. 
Defense spending can also create economic problems for future generations. Robert 
Hormats, former senior economic advisor to Kissinger and one of Haig’s Assistant Secretaries of 
State, grants Reagan credit for pushing the Soviet Union to the brink with U.S. defense spending 
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but also details the dangerous fiscal cost of doing so. Hormats lauds George H.W. Bush and Bill 
Clinton for paying down the high costs of Reagan’s military buildup. Hormats’ defense of 
Reagan’s defense spending policy is half-hearted, at best.307 Was it really necessary for two 
successive presidents to pay the cost of equipment and troops their predecessor never came close 
to fully utilizing?  
John Arquilla, a conservative defense analyst and certainly no opponent of Reagan’s, 
criticized the 1980s defense buildup as completely mismatched to the national security 
challenges that emerged after the Cold War. He described how Reagan’s surge pumped money 
into outdated programs and equipment designed to fight the conventional nation-state wars of the 
past. He delineated legacy defense systems still absorbing massive sums of taxpayer money 
twenty years after Reagan added them. Arquilla argued that these systems have not been useful 
in combatting terrorist targets or holding territory in places like Afghanistan and Iraq.308 
 
The Triumph of the National Security State: Treaties are Temporary, 
Spending Endures 
 
 In 2006, Arquilla wrote The Reagan Imprint while working on Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld’s staff. As with McFarlane and Schultz’s views of the Vietnam War, Arquilla 
believed that America could win wars it was losing—or wars it had not yet elected to fight—if 
leaders would only adopt the right tactics or procure the right equipment.309 Arquilla’s Pentagon 
superiors Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz, like McFarlane and Schultz, 
expressed frustration that they were not given the necessary military support to succeed in 
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Lebanon during the early 1980s. In 2003, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz directed a U.S. military fully 
grown out of Reagan’s defense buildup, and no Weinberger to hamstring their efforts. They now 
occupied Weinberger’s position. This time around, they opted not just for U.S. military presence, 
but full-scale invasion of a Middle Eastern country. During the first year of the U.S. occupation, 
Rumsfeld and the Pentagon administered governance of Iraq directly through Paul Bremer, one 
of McFarlane’s NSC point men on the 1982 nuclear freeze campaign. As with Grenada, the 
administration did not find the weapons caches they expected to find in order to justify the 
invasion. Of course, unlike Grenada, the war stretched on for years and faded out in bipartisan 
ignominy. 
 Weinberger’s former military attaché Colin Powell sensed the danger of an expanding 
military in the hands of leaders itching to use it to achieve difficult political goals overseas. In his 
1995 memoir, Powell shared an anecdote highlighting a power projection attitude shared by 
George Schultz and his predecessors who prosecuted the Vietnam War. Powell served as 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs during the first six months of the Clinton administration, and 
counseled Weinberger-like restraint to Clinton’s team in a White House meeting on potential 
U.S. intervention in Bosnia: 
The debate exploded at one session when Madeleine Albright, our ambassador to the UN, 
asked me in frustration, “What’s the point of having this superb military that you’re 
always talking about if we can’t use it?” I thought I would have an aneurysm. American 
GIs were not toy soldiers to be moved around on some sort of global game board…. I 
told Ambassador Albright that the U.S. military would carry out any mission it was 
handed, but my advice would always be that the tough political goals had to be set first. 
Then we would accomplish the mission.310 
 
Powell feared what “heroic statesmen” like Albright, as Schultz before her, would try to 
do with the increasingly “superb military” they had at their disposal. Powell, in this anecdote, 
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expressed wariness of politicians who would deploy U.S. troops without appropriately weighing 
the cost. Journalistic and literary works have documented the psychological and social effects on 
individuals who experience combat, and Powell had experienced the Vietnam War firsthand.311 
Ironically, when he served in the George W. Bush administration in Schultz’s former position 
alongside Rumsfeld, he did not restrain administration from launching a war that—like 
Vietnam—lasted for more than a decade and failed to “accomplish the mission.”  
Hormats, writing only four years into the second Iraq War, showed how the costs of war 
wiped out the fiscal accomplishments of the preceding two presidents in paying the mortgage on 
Reagan’s defense buildup.312 Current and future administrations will likely continue to pay in 
some way for the Iraq War. Thus, Reagan’s defense spending surge was both costly in the initial 
spending and the future conflicts resulting from leaders inspired by the political potential of this 
ever-growing “superb military.” Weinberger and Reagan exercised restraint in troop 
deployments in the 1980s, but as the 2000s have shown, that is no guarantee that future 
administrations will confine themselves to only the “fun” wars. 
After the end of the Cold War, U.S. military spending eventually dipped back down to 
pre-Reagan levels. However, this “peace dividend” might have further reduced the defense 
budget to lower 1970s levels if the buildup had not taken place first.313 Reagan’s 1983 SDI 
proposal prolonged the defense spending surge well beyond when bipartisan Congressional 
opponents were aiming to put on the brakes. Reagan and George H.W. Bush inked nuclear arms 
reduction deals with the Soviets, but SDI spending—under a series of evolving missile defense 
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labels—continued in perpetuity.314 Perhaps Schultz was right, and the “Vietnam syndrome” did 
restrain Weinberger from using troops to pursue politics by other means. If the American 
government does not limit troop deployments out of a disciplined fear of “expend[ing] its 
strength to the point of exhaustion” and “bankrupt[ing] its own policy, and future,” as military 
theorist B. H. Liddell Hart put it, perhaps an “Iraq syndrome” will restrain leaders for a time.315 
But when the prior war is paid off, and the defense budget still burgeoning, the time likely will 
come again to wield that “superb military” against the global political crisis of the day. 
Garry Wills criticized Reagan for continually constructing a “substitute past, an illusion 
of it,” in order to simplify hard truths for Americans in a manner that clarified the nation’s 
identity. In Wills’ words, Reagan “found the Kremlin in Hollywood and defeated it.”316 Reagan 
was effective in reconstructing the past when contrasting his “peace through strength” with 
Carter’s “malaise,” and in presenting the victory in Grenada as a global Cold War win that 
applied to the situation in Lebanon. Reagan’s supporters and popular culture similarly construct a 
“substitute past” out of Reagan’s presidency where “peace through strength” came through 
defense spending and a muscular foreign policy. Historian James Young wrote how monuments 
of the Vietnam War were “often ironic, self-effacing conceptual installations that mark…national 
ambivalence and uncertainty.”317 In contrast to memorials of and films about Vietnam, the 
Reagan era produced pop culture memorials like the film Top Gun (1986), based on a 1981 
skirmish between American and Libyan fighter pilots. Andrew Bacevich argued that military 
films with an “upbeat message” like Top Gun “magically made those [Vietnam] wounds 
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disappear.” Top Gun was “warfare…against a political backdrop shorn of messy ambiguities,” 
much like the “peace through strength” Reagan projected rather successfully.318 
Reagan’s defense spending may have given him the confidence and cover he needed to 
negotiate an arms control agreement with Gorbachev, but the economic, social, and cultural 
legacies of spending are more permanent than his legacy of disarmament. On August 2, 2019, the 
Donald Trump administration formally withdrew the United States from Reagan and Schultz’s 
INF Treaty. The treaty was the centerpiece of the “triumph” Schultz and Wilson referenced in 
their book titles and had set in motion twenty years of successive nuclear arms reductions by 
Russia and the United States. Between the 1987 signing of INF and today, global warhead 
stockpiles decreased from 70,000 in 1986 to fewer than 15,000.319  
Withdrawal from the INF Treaty of course does not completely undo Reagan and 
Schultz’s arms control accomplishments. The warheads eliminated by the INF and other treaties 
are gone forever. The Trump administration may succeed in replacing Reagan’s arms control 
regime with another, perhaps one that demands commitments from China as well. But there is no 
guarantee that a new agreement will materialize. Even if the United States and Russia strike a 
better arms control deal in the coming years, withdrawal from INF is symbolic of a persistent 
phenomenon. For a range of reasons, it is easier for an American president to discard a treaty 
than to reduce the defense budget. As Mary Dudziak has pointed out, the U.S. national security 
state has continually expanded since the end of World War II. Even as the Cold War has passed, 
and as the War on Terror will pass, “war time” will endure.320 Our leaders may exercise the 
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disciplined military restraint of Cap Weinberger for a time. However, unless we also restrain the 
ladling of increasing sums into the defense budget, we are bound to see another Vietnam or Iraq 
once the “syndrome” of restraint wears off yet again. 
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